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ABSTRACT 
Classical risk-based or game-theoretic security models rely on assumptions from 
reliability theory and rational expectations economics that are not applicable to security 
threats.  Additionally, these models suffer from serious deficiencies when they are 
applied to software-intensive, socio-technical systems.  Recent work by Leveson in the 
area of system safety engineering has led to the development of a new accident model for 
system safety that acknowledges the dynamic complexity of accidents.  Systems-
Theoretic Accident Models and Processes (STAMP) applies principles from control 
theory to enforce constraints on hazards and thereby prevent accidents.  Appreciating the 
similarities between safety and security while still acknowledging the differences, this 
thesis extends STAMP to security problems.  In particular, it is applied to identify and 
mitigate the threats that could emerge in critical infrastructures such as the Air 
Transportation System.  Furthermore, recommendations are provided to assist systems 
engineers and policy makers in securely transitioning to the Next Generation Air 
Transportation System (NGATS). 
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CHAPTER 1:  Introduction 
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1.1  Introduction 
“Don’t cross the street with a dead horse.”  This popular Midwest expression 
captures the idea that if one seeks to accomplish a task, one must be prepared.  
Unfortunately, since the Internet achieved wide-spread usage about ten years ago, the 
popular media has been flooded with stories of stolen credit cards, distributed denial of 
service (DDoS) attacks, viruses, and other malicious activities.  It is clear that insufficient 
attention is being paid by the technical community in the area of system security 
engineering.  We are not prepared. 
The author’s hypothesis is that:  
System Theoretic Accident Models and Processes (STAMP) can be extended 
beyond the field of system safety into the realm of security.  STAMP will be useful 
in identifying and controlling threats.  Additionally, it will be valuable in early 
stages of design, identify non-“event” security issues, and illustrate dynamic 
relationships. 
 
This proposition is validated by extending the classical STAMP framework for hazard 
analysis and applying the new methodology to the US Air Transportation System (ATS).  
First, the security of the current ATS will be studied.  After that, changes resulting from 
the transition from the current architecture to NGATS will be examined.  The results of 
the analysis are presented in a format accessible to system engineers who design the Next 
Generation Air Transportation System and policy makers who influence and direct it. 
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According to Ross Anderson,  
 
“security engineering is about building systems to remain dependable in the face 
of malice, error, or mischance.  As a discipline, it focuses on the tools, processes, 
and methods needed to design, implement, and test complete systems, and to 
adapt existing systems as their environment evolves.  Security engineering 
requires cross-disciplinary expertise, ranging from cryptography and computer 
security through hardware tamper-resistance and formal methods to a knowledge 
of applied psychology, organizational and audit methods, and the law.  System 
engineering skills, from business process analysis through software engineering to 
evaluation and testing, are also important…” (Anderson 2001) 
 
The interdisciplinary nature of the security problem is one of the key factors that makes 
the solution so elusive.  Traditional, disciplinary approaches on their own are often 
insufficient to accomplish the security goals of a system.  Only a comprehensive 
methodology has the potential to succeed.   
 Many security related terms have moved into colloquial language and 
unfortunately lost their rigorous definitions.  Key security terms are defined below to 
remove all ambiguity about the author’s use of the terms in this thesis. 
Security:  A system property that implies protection of the informational, operational, 
and physical elements from malicious intent. 
 
Vulnerability:  A weakness in a system that can be exploited to violate the system’s 
intended behavior relative to security. 
 
Threat:  An intentional action aimed at exploiting a vulnerability. 
 
It is also necessary to clarify the relationship between system security engineering 
and similar activities such as information assurance (IA), reliability engineering, safety 
engineering, and trust.  The 1996 DoD Directive 5-3600.1 defines IA as “Information 
operations that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their 
availability, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation; including providing for 
restoration of the information system by incorporation, detection, and reaction 
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capabilities.”  In practice, assurance activities usually involve a process of ensuring that 
availability, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation activities are performed, not 
how to perform them or how well they are performed.  Therefore, information assurance 
is only part of a security engineering solution.   
Reliability “is the probability that a component will perform its intended function 
satisfactorily for a prescribed time and under stipulated conditions.”  Probability values 
are usually based on accidental failure rather than malicious intent.  However, if security 
is inadequate, an attacker could decrease the reliability of a system.   
Safety “is freedom from accidents or losses.” (Leveson 1995)  Similarly, safety 
analyses typically assume no malicious intent, but the results of a security breach could 
certainly jeopardize the safety of a system.  (Hasselbring 2006) define trust as a property 
that is achieved when correctness, safety, availability, reliability, performance, security, 
and privacy qualities are met.  In this definition, security is a subset of trust because one 
may trust a system if one perceives it to be safe, reliable, and secure.  Clearly, system 
security and security engineering are related to IA, reliability, safety, and trust, yet are 
distinct concepts.  Nevertheless, much can be learned from methodologies used in safety, 
assurance, and other related fields.  “…Although safety-related systems is a specialized 
topic, the fruits from safety-related process research could, and should, be applied to 
support the development of system engineering and the management of other system 
properties, such as security and reliability.” (Eliot 1998)  Therefore, this thesis 
investigates the applicability of adapting a safety engineering methodology based on 
systems theory to a security problem. 
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1.2  Types of Security 
Large scale, complex systems require physical, communication, computer, 
information, and operational security.  Vulnerabilities often emerge in an engineering 
system when one or more of the aforementioned types are omitted.  This will be shown in 
detail in the following sections where the Air Transportation System is analyzed.  
Attackers rarely choose to directly engage the most secure aspects of a system such as the 
cryptographic algorithms.  In the words of the former Internet Chief Protocols Architect, 
Dave Clark, “Encryption is perfect, no one break codes, they just steal the key.”  (Clark 
2006) 
 Physical security is concerned with preventing damage to the physical system as 
well as theft.  The activities to achieve this goal involve maintaining power supplies, 
controlling physical access to the system, maintaining environmental conditions, and 
protecting the system from radiation, fire, and other disturbances.  Historical approaches 
to physical security such as guarding a “computer room” are inadequate in large scale 
systems because computation is distributed among hundreds or thousands of devices.  
Therefore, securing the physical system requires considering all the physical subsystems 
and components (Anderson 2001). 
 Communications security requires the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
data.  Confidentiality is achieved only when a message is received by the intended 
recipient(s).  Integrity is achieved when the recipient receives the same message that the 
sender originally transmitted.  Finally, receipt of data in an acceptable time window 
defines availability.  Cryptology, the science of cryptography (creating and using 
cryptosystem) and cryptanalysis (breaking cryptosystems) first emerged in 
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communications security to achieve confidentiality and in some cases integrity (Menezes 
1997).  With the development of computers, it also found use in computer security. 
 Computer security is concerned with the activities of authorized and unauthorized 
users of a computer system.  Activities involve prevention, detection, and minimization 
of consequences.  Threats can be classified as both passive and active. 
Active Threats Passive Threats 
Overwriting Browsing 
Modifying Aggregation and interference
Inserting Replaying 
Deleting Leakage 
Blocking access to Copying and distributing 
 
Table 1.  Threat Classifications.  
Table Source (Herrmann 2002) 
 
A variety of computer security models exist to mitigate the aforementioned threats.  The 
Bell-LaPadula model, commonly referred to as “no read up, no write down” is a formal 
state transition model that defines access control rules.  “Users can only create content at 
or above their own security level” and “only view content at or below their own security 
level.” (Bell 1973)  The model was the foundation of the DoD Trusted Computer System 
Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) commonly referred to as the “Orange Book.”  Although the 
authors explicitly mention the use of system theory in the development of their model, 
they still view security as a mathematical property.  Significant weaknesses such as 
neglecting the problem of the clandestine exchange of information motivated other 
researchers to develop competing models.  Additionally, research shifted from 
military/intelligence computer systems to commercial systems.  During this time period, 
other models focusing on data integrity rather than confidentiality arose such as the Biba 
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model (1977), which is the mathematical dual of Bell-LaPadula – a “read up/write down” 
model (Bishop 2005). 
 In a fundamental departure from earlier models, David Clark and David Wilson 
defined a model that focuses on what users actually do, concentrating on user 
transactions.  Constrained data items are subject to integrity constraints with integrity 
verification procedures to determine if the system is in a valid state.  The model also 
permits transformation procedures to move the system from one valid state to another 
(Clark 1987).  Not surprisingly, hybrid models also exist, such as the Chinese Wall 
Model, that are concerned with both integrity and confidentiality (Bishop 2005). 
 In the early 1990s, the convergence of computers and communication gave birth 
to the concept of information security.  It is “the protection of information against 
unauthorized disclosure, transfer, or destruction, whether accidental or intentional.”  
Standards and procedures for information security were initially developed by primarily 
European and International bodies.  The US response emerging from the NSA and Office 
of the Secretary of Defense became the Systems Security Engineering Capability 
Maturity Model (SEE-CMM).  SEE-CMM is structured very similar to its predecessors:  
the system engineering capability maturity model and software engineering capability 
maturity model.  As a result, it unfortunately suffers from many of the same weaknesses.  
According to Bach:  “At worst, the CMM is a whitewash that obscures the true dynamics 
of software engineering and suppresses alternative models.” (Bach 1994) 
 The final type of security is operational security.  Procedures include personnel 
operations, data operations (such as audit procedures), and administrative operations.  
Security clearances and badging, security training, virus scan procedures, backup 
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schedules, password rules, computer usage rules, and other similar activities fall into 
operations security.  Like physical security, operations security is far more challenging to 
achieve in distributed, complex systems (DoD 2006).  Tight coupling related to security 
exists among infrastructure systems.  Telecommunications, banking, power, oil and gas 
distribution, water, transportation, EMS, and government interact and exhibit intricate 
dependences. 
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CHAPTER 2:  The Next Generation Air Transportation 
System (NGATS) 
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The Next Generation Air Transportation System 
 
 In 2004, the US Congress passed the Vision 100 – Century of Aviation 
Reauthorization Act in response to pressures on the current US Air Transportation 
System.  Post 9/11 economics and demand asymptotically approaching capacity at many 
key airports necessitates a radically new approach.  A senior policy team made up of the 
Secretary of Transportation (Chair), Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Homeland 
Security, Secretary of Commerce, Director of the Office of Science and Technology 
Policy, Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 
and Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was formed to provide 
policy guidance.  Also, a Joint Program Development Office (JPDO) was created to 
manage the development of NGATS.   
FAA
Administrator
 FAA
Air Traffic 
Organization
JPDO
Director
Senior Policy 
Committee
Ultimately accountable to
Reports directly
 
Figure 1.  JPDO Reporting Lines. 
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On page ii of the Strategic Plan, it states that the JPDO strategies are centered on: 
• Developing the airport infrastructure to meet future demand by empowering local 
communities and regions to create alternative concepts of how airports will be 
used and managed in the future. 
• Establishing an effective security system without limiting mobility or civil 
liberties by embedding security measures throughout the air transportation system 
– from curb to curb. Creating a transparent set of security layers will deliver 
security without creating undue delays, limiting access, or adding excessive costs 
and time. 
• Creating a responsive air traffic system by devising alternative concepts of 
airspace and airport operations to serve present and future aircraft. As new vehicle 
classes and business models emerge, such as remotely operated vehicles and 
spaceports, the safe and efficient operation of all vehicles in the National Airspace 
System will be critical to creating new markets in aviation and beyond. 
• Providing each traveler and operator in the system with the specific situational 
awareness they need to reach decisions through the creation of a combined 
information network. All users of the system will have access to the air 
transportation system data they require for their operations. 
• Managing safety through a comprehensive and proactive approach that can 
integrate major changes, such as new technologies or procedures. This will be 
done in a timely manner and without compromising aviation’s current superior 
safety record. 
• Introducing new policies, operational procedures, and technologies to minimize 
the impact of noise and emissions on the environment and eliminate ground 
contaminants at airports. This effort includes exploration of alternative fuels, 
engine and aircraft designs. These actions will result in reduced environmental 
impact and sustained aviation growth. 
• Reducing the impact of weather on air travel through a system wide capability for 
enhanced weather observations and forecasts, integrating them with the tools used 
by air system operators. This capability will substantially improve airspace 
capacity and efficiency while enhancing safety. 
• Harmonizing equipage and operations globally by developing and employing 
uniform standards, procedures, and air and space transportation policies 
worldwide, enhancing safety and efficiency on a global scale. 
 
There has never been a transformation effort similar to this one with as many 
stakeholders and as broad in scope. The objective of this plan is to provide the 
opportunity for creative solutions for the future of air transportation, our security and our 
hope for a vibrant future. 
Table 2.  NGATS Strategic Plan. 
Table Source (JPDO 2004) 
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The United States Air Transportation System faces challenges in three areas:  
security, gridlock, and maintaining global leadership.  The current customs service will 
need to be substantially modified to accommodate the projected three-fold increase in 
international passenger and cargo volume resulting in 120 million additional passengers 
by 2015 (FAA 2004a).  Gridlock is already a major problem at US metropolitan airports.  
One hour wait times were encountered by millions of American in 2000 (FAA 2004b).  
Economic models predict that in 2025, US consumers could lose $20 billion due to 
congestion. 
 
Figure 2.  Estimated Congestion in 2020. 
Image Source (JPDO 2004) 
If the congestion issue is not resolved, same-day travel and reliable scheduled travel will 
exist only in people’s memories.  By 2025, twenty additional airports will have 500,000 
annual departures (the size of Detroit’s current operations) (FAA 2004b).  According to 
the JPDO, “The current method of handling traffic flow will not be able to adapt to the 
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higher volume and density demanded of it in the future, even if twice as many or more 
resources are devoted to it.”  The red and black areas in the graphic below dominate most 
of the US land area and indicate demand exceeding supply. 
 
Figure 3.  Effect of Doubling Demand on Sectors. 
Image Source (JPDO 2004) 
 
The variety of transportation options will grow in the next two decades.  UAVs, 
micro-jets (5 passengers), super jumbo-jets (600 passengers +), and other 21st century 
innovations will radically change US airspace.  Small perturbations in how people travel 
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and transport goods will require major overhauls of the transportation infrastructure.  “A 
shift of 2% of today’s commercial passenger to micro-jets that seat 4-6 passengers would 
result in triple the number of flights in order to carry the same number of passengers.” 
(JPDO 2004) 
 
Figure 4.  Uncertainty in Vehicle Capacity. 
Image Source (JPDO 2004) 
The JPDO has three performance goals: 
• Satisfy future growth in demand (up to three times current levels) and operational 
diversity 
• Reduce transit time and increase predictability (domestic curb-to-curb transit time 
cut by 30%) 
• Minimize the impact of weather and other disruptions (95% on time) 
However, the uncertainty associated with the profile of aircraft in twenty years makes it 
difficult to develop a strategy.  Industry estimates for micro-jet usage place operations at 
40% of daily passenger travel by 2025 (Royce 2004).  The current 5000 airports will need 
to adapt as daily passenger traffic will rise from 2 million to 4-5 million and cargo traffic 
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will triple.  Parallel runways, improved wake vortex sensing, and relaxation of single 
runway occupancy restrictions are being considered to improve system throughput.  
Without expensive ground-based equipment, the JPDO hopes to have precision 
approaches available on every US runway. 
 Aircraft themselves will be transformed to achieve the goals of NGATS.  “Future 
aircraft will sense, control, communicate, and navigate with increasing levels of 
autonomy.”  In some cases co-pilots will be replaced by computers, in others, there will 
be no pilot at all.  UAVs will be subject to reduced separation standards and more 
flexible spacing will be applied to both aircraft in-flight and on the ground.  Additionally, 
a paradigmatic shift is planned for air traffic control.  Controllers will move from 
controlling individual aircraft to managing airspace based on flows.  There exists a large 
body of knowledge around optimization of network flows that will surely guide these 
efforts.  Also, recent work by Tom Krenzke (Krenzke 2006) at Draper Laboratory offers 
powerful techniques for UAV route planning.  Other changes include (under normal 
conditions) the elimination of voice communication from data link capable aircraft and 
the incorporation of new technologies that make two sets of flight procedures, instrument 
and visual, unnecessary.   
Given the proposed changes, the pressing question remains, “How can the US 
transition to NGATS in such a way that security improves, rather than worsens?” With 
the goal of assisting JPDO leaders in making an informed decision, this research provides 
a systematic review of the threats that could emerge.  Also, acknowledging the colossal 
failure of the FAA’s Advanced Automation System in the mid 1990s resulting in $2.9 
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billion spent on a system that was never deployed (Barlas 1996), the JPDO must not 
allow complexity to grow out of control. 
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CHAPTER 3:  Classical Security Analysis Techniques 
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3.1  Classical Approaches 
 
 A variety of approaches exist both in industrial practice and the academic 
literature for conducting security analyses on large infrastructure systems.  These 
methods include “best practice engineering,” quantitative risk assessment, game theory, 
and red teaming.  The four classical approaches each have their own strengths and 
weaknesses but unfortunately do not provide total coverage for the system security 
problem. 
 The most common security technique is simply to apply best practices.  This 
approach is usually conducted in an unsystematic way and reduces or removes only the 
most obvious vulnerabilities.  If a systematic approach is taken to develop a 
comprehensive body of best practice literature, the best practice approach would be far 
more useful to engineers developing large systems.  Usually, security engineers will 
employ one or more of the following methods to supplement best practice approaches. 
3.2  Risk-Based Security 
 Risk-based security seeks to quantify security risks by assigning severity and 
likelihood ratings to attack scenarios.  The emphasis of this technique has been on risk-
based decision-making whose goal is to direct security investments as opposed to 
modeling particular kinds of threats.  The approach is derived from reliability models of 
accident causation that are rooted in a chain-of-events perspective.  Whether part of a 
preliminary hazard analysis or an accident reconstruction activity, the reliability engineer 
attempts to understand the potential or actual accident by identifying the events or faults 
that could initiate the accident.  Such fault and event trees are usually part of a method 
called probabilistic risk assessment (PRA).  The goals of PRA are to estimate both the 
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likelihood and severity of a risk.  PRA was developed in the mid 1970s to improve 
nuclear power plant safety.  Professor Norm Rasmussen of MIT chaired the Reactor 
Safety Study that was the first real probabilistic risk assessment (Apostolakis 2000). 
A probabilistic risk assessment is a four step process: 
 
1. Identify undesirable events. 
2. Identify accident scenarios (sequences of events). 
3. Estimate the probability of each scenario either based on statistical testing data, or 
expert judgment if scenarios are rare. 
4. Rank the accident scenarios according to likelihood. 
 
The framework yields a probability for each undesirable event identified in stage 1. 
 
PRA turned out to be very successful for assessing risks in nuclear power shut-
down systems.  Such systems were historically very simple, electro-mechanical systems 
designed to minimize unnecessary complexity and used proven analog electrical 
technologies.  PRA carries with it a number of important assumptions: 
1. The events or faults at each node in the trees are collectively exhaustive — all 
possible events are identified. 
2. The events or faults at each node in the trees are mutually exclusive — they 
cannot occur simultaneously. 
3. The probability of each scenario is accurate enough to be useful to decision 
makers. 
 
In the reactor shut-down system, nuclear engineers with decades of experience can 
probably develop trees that satisfy the first two assumptions due to their intimate 
knowledge of reactor design and operation.  Furthermore, component technologies such 
as electrical relays could be extensively tested in the laboratory to compute reliability 
metrics such as mean time between failures (MTBF).  
However, when complex systems like the Space Shuttle are considered, serious 
questions arise regarding the appropriateness of PRA.  For instance, how does software 
change the picture?  How can the MTBF of unique digital electronics be estimated?  How 
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many events or faults must be accounted for?  Herein lies the problem of applying PRA 
to software-intensive systems (Laracy 2007a).  Software does not wear out and fail; it 
only implements a set of requirements that may or may not be correct.  According to 
PRA analysts, subjective probability (expert judgment) must be used when thousands of 
laboratory MTBF tests cannot be carried out.  However, software in one environment 
may produce desirable behavior, while in a slightly different one it may do the worst 
possible action.  Therefore, the meaning of the subjective probability value is not clear.  
Additionally, if a spacecraft computer has 128 MB of memory, or 230 bits, then it has 
2number of bits or 22^30 states.  Clearly, each state cannot be analyzed.   
Before the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, NASA headquarters reported the 
probability of a failure with loss of vehicle and human life as 10-5 (Feynman 1986).  
Before the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster, the reported probability was 1/250 
(Stamatelatos 2002).  According to NASA space operations spokesman, Allard Beutel, 
the post-Columbia figure is now 1/100 (Scottberg 2006).  Recently, researchers in the 
field of PRA acknowledged that PRA should not be the sole basis for decision making 
and that the quantitative results should be part of risk-informed, not risk-based decisions.  
They acknowledge that human factors, software, safety culture, and design errors are not 
well handled by PRA (Apostolakis 2004).   
Given the central role of human factors, software, culture, and design errors in 
security, PRA’s applicability to security problems is also dubious.  Donn Parker makes 
an insightful observation in this regard: 
Security risk is not measurable, because the frequencies and impacts of future 
incidents are mutually dependent variables with unknown mutual dependency 
under control of unknown and often irrational enemies with unknown skills, 
knowledge, resources, authority, motives, and objectives – operating from 
unknown locations at unknown future times with the possible intent of attacking 
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known by untreated vulnerabilities that are known to the attackers but unknown 
to the defenders. (Parker 2007) 
 
None-the-less, a variety of researchers have attempted to supplement pure, reliability-
based PRA with other techniques to make it relevant to security. 
 Michaud and Apostolakis developed a scenario-based methodology to rank 
elements of an infrastructure system according to their value to the stakeholders.  
Through a combination of probabilistic risk assessment, multi-attribute utility theory, and 
graph theory, the methodology models the infrastructure system as a network.  After 
scenarios are generated, a value tree is built to evaluate scenarios and their consequences.  
The value tree incorporates the disutility of each scenario and vulnerability categories are 
assigned ranging from level I (Red) to level V (Green).  The high level goal of this 
approach is to answer the following questions (Michaud 2006): 
1. What can go wrong? 
2. What are its consequences? 
3. How likely is it?  
 
However, the first two questions are actually answered by qualitative hazard or threat 
analysis techniques, while the last question may not be answerable in rare events such as 
the terrorist attack of 9/11/2001. 
In order to address the problem of high-level screening of vulnerabilities, Paté-
Cornell and Guikema have synthesized techniques from probabilistic risk assessment, 
decision analysis, and game theory.  Their goal is to develop a “model for setting 
priorities among threats and among countermeasures.” The model is represented by a 
decision tree, or statically as an influence diagram.  In the introduction, the authors 
acknowledge that: 
Some of the probabilities may be based on frequencies of past events, but most 
reflect the opinions of the best available experts….results may reflect classic 
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biases grounded in the nature of the last attack or in a professional familiarity 
with some terrifying scenarios. (Pate-Cornel 2002) 
 
In order to address this bias on the subjective probabilities, Paté-Cornell and Guikema 
suggest enlisting experts from different fields.   
It is not clear that this remedy addresses all the concerns raised in the Kahneman’s 
2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics work on biases in judgment of subjective 
probabilities.  According to Tversky and Kahneman’s seminal paper (Tversky 1974), the 
three common heuristics used from making decisions under uncertainty often lead to 
flawed results.  The first heuristic is representativeness.  Representativeness is used by 
humans when they are challenged to guess the probability that an event α belongs to a 
process β.  Insensitivity to prior probability outcomes, sample size, and predictability, as 
well as the illusion of validity, and misconceptions of regression, plague the use of 
representative thinking for generated subjective probabilities.  The second heuristic is 
availability (of instances or scenarios).  Availability is used to assess the plausibility of a 
particular development.  It suffers from biases due to the retrievability of instances, the 
effectiveness of a search set, and imaginability, as well as illusory correlation.  The last 
heuristic is called adjustment from the anchor.  Often, people estimate values, such a 
probabilities, by starting with an initial p0 and make a series of adjustments until a 
desirable pf is obtained.  However, it has been shown that “different starting points yield 
different estimates, which are biased toward the initial value.”  Adjustment from the 
anchor is prone to insufficient adjustment, biases in the evaluation of conjunctive and 
disjunctive events, and anchoring in the assessment of subjective probability 
distributions. 
  
 Page 32 of 133 
Paté-Cornell and Guikema’s technique has four steps: 
1. Identification of an exhaustive set of classes of attack scenarios 
2. Assessment of the likelihood of occurrences of these classes of scenarios based on 
intent, chances of success given intent, and attractiveness from the point of view 
of the perpetrators. 
3. Prioritization of these attack scenarios based both on their likelihood and on the 
expected damage to the US if they occur. 
4. Modeling of the dynamics of the situation as a “game” between the different 
parties with learning on both sides, by updating both the model and the parameter 
values after each time period. (Pate-Cornel 2002) 
 
A key assumption in this analysis is the use of the rational decision analysis model in 
descriptive mode (Von Neumann 1953).  However, the authors rightly point out that “in 
reality, human behaviors generally violate these axioms (of rationality).  For example, 
people show circularity in preferences (which they often do not know how to evaluate), 
and do not necessarily satisfy the ‘sure thing principle’(Savage 1954) .”(Pate-Cornel 
2002)  “The Sure-Thing Principle says that if a decision maker would take a certain 
action if he knew that an event E was obtained, and also if he knew that its negation E’ 
was obtained, then he should take that action even if he knows nothing about E.” 
(Aumann 2005) 
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In the game-theoretic aspect of the approach, each side assigns a probability 
distribution on the beliefs of the other side.  The US computes the probability of an attack 
scenario with the following method (Pate-Cornel 2002): 
),|(),|(),|( jijjiTEjijTE IWSUIWSPIWUE ×=  
 
ETE:  US assessment of the expected value of a random variable as viewed by the 
terrorists. 
Uj:  Utility function (preferences) of group j. 
Wi:  Choice of weapon for an attack attempt. 
Ij:  Intent from group j to attack in the next time period. 
PTE:  Probability as assessed by the US of a terrorist probability estimation (e.g., 
of their own chances of success in a specified attack scenario). 
S:  Successful attack (of any kind) 
 
Where 
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ν (Xijk):  Value of attribute k (e.g., the number of causalities inflicted) for terrorist 
group j (e.g., Islamic fundamentalists) in the case of a successful attack with 
weapon i (e.g., a biological attack). 
 
The utilities are then renormalized to provide probabilities of terrorist actions Wi for each 
group conditional on that group’s intent Ij to launch an attack.  It is important to note that 
there is great uncertainty about the terrorist’s utility functions.  The model also assumes 
that for each time step of the game, each terrorist group plans only one type of attack.  
Furthermore, “the probability of a specified type of attack is proportional to the ease of 
execution and the damage inflicted on the US.” (Pate-Cornel 2002)  Finally, the attack 
scenarios are assumed to be mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive.  Therefore, 
the probability as assessed by the US to represent US beliefs of scenario Wi, given intent 
to attack by group j (Ij) is: 
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Additional steps including cost-benefit analysis identify the countermeasures that 
produce the greatest decrease in disutility to the US.  A graphical illustration of a game 
theory example is given below. 
 
Figure 5.  Game Theoretic Model for Terrorism. 
Image Source (Pate-Cornel 2002) 
 
Patterson and Apostolakis build on Paté-Cornell and Guikema’s overarching 
model to define a screening methodology in order to determine the distribution of anti-
terrorism funding for regions with multiple critical infrastructures.  While this work 
identifies the sites on which to focus resources, it does not offer insight about what to do 
at the sites.  This research is an extension of work done by Apostolakis and Lemon that 
merges multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) and PRA, but also adds Monte Carlo 
network analysis and geographic analysis methods (Patterson 2006). 
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Companies such as Risk Management Solutions, Ltd. (RMS) also make use of 
quantitative methods of risk assessment.  In a company technical report on PRA, Woo 
acknowledges the work of the RAND Corporation in applying complexity theory to 
social networks.  This research has focused on developing models of swarm intelligence 
based on ant colony principles used in cellular robotic systems.  Such an approach 
acknowledges the architectural structure of many terrorist organizations: decentralized, 
independent hubs.  It is significant that the notion of swarming is not restricted to 3-D 
spatial location, but could include dimensions “such as support for jihad; disdain for 
democracy, western culture, etc.”(Woo 2002) 
Risk Management Solutions is developing a stochastic terrorism model based on 
an event-tree of detrimental operational factors.  This is very surprising given that Dr. 
Gordon Woo, Chief Architect for the RMS terrorism model, acknowledges that 
“obviously, a different approach is required to the traditional reductionist bottom-up 
approach used for modeling the inanimate world of engineering physics:  the human 
dimension to conflict must be incorporated.” (Woo 2002)  The RMS model is concerned 
with events of macroterrorism, “spectacular acts of terrorism that cause more than $1 
billion of loss, or 500 deaths.”  While he acknowledges that a Monte Carlo simulation 
would be ideal to analyze the temporal pattern of acts of macroterror, Woo simplifies the 
problem to a two-state Markov process: 
 State 1:  Relaxed security, conducive conditions for an attack 
State 2:  Strict security, not conducive conditions for an attack. 
This view of the world implies that it is optimal for terrorists to patiently wait for State 1 
so as to secure the “infinite payoff of paradise promised to martyrs.” (Woo 2002) 
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Like (Michaud 2006), (Pate-Cornel 2002), and (Patterson 2006), Woo attempts to 
quantitatively prioritize targets.  He begins by invoking Fechner’s Law which states that 
an arithmetic progress in perceptions requires a geometrical progression in their stimuli. 
expressed as: 
0
ln
S
Skp ×=  
where 
p:  perception 
k:  empirically determined constant 
S:  instantaneous stimuli 
S0:  initial stimuli. 
 
Therefore, the logarithm of the utility for the C’th city tier and T’th type of attack is:  
 
TkCkkTCULn 210)],([ −−= . 
Weber’s law assumes that just noticeable differences are additive.  This means that they 
can be added in an analogous manner to the addition of units of a physical quantity 
(Britannica. 2007). 
Game theory is used to define the functional dependence of target probability on 
utility to produce the target probability distribution.  Al-Qaeda has been shown to adopt a 
strategy of avoiding targets with unknown security measures, conducting detailed 
surveillance of potential targets, and randomizing target selection.   
For an attack using a specific weapon against: 
 a target in category [C,T] and 
defense D 
Let PD be the probability that the defense is unable to prevent or stop the attack. 
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For a defense saturation condition expressed as a power law: 
λ−−∝∂
∂ ],[ TCU
D
PD . 
According to game theory optimization using a mixed strategy, the probability of 
selecting a target is: 
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Finally, combining the formulas yields: 
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Let b1 = (λ-1)k1 and b2 = (λ-1)k2.   
So: 
TbCbaTCUPLog 21])},[({ −−=  
The final equation states that the relative likelihood of targets being attacked depends on 
only b1 and b2 (Woo 2002). 
A US Department of Homeland Security program at the University of Southern 
California, the Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE), 
was created to “evaluate risk, costs, and consequences of terrorism and to guide 
economically viable investments in countermeasures that will make our Nation safer and 
more secure.” (USC 2005)  The modeling framework of CREATE is based on classical 
risk analysis. 
 Page 38 of 133 
 
Figure 6.  CREATE Modeling and Analysis Areas. 
Image Source (USC 2005) 
 
One of CREATE’s projects is an investigation into improving commercial aviation 
security against the threat of man-portable-air-defense-systems, MANPADS.  The risk 
analysis makes use of both qualitative methods for studying threat scenarios as well as 
simulation models for estimating probabilities of successful attacks given characteristics 
of the weapon, aircraft flight path, attacker location, and other parameters.  The economic 
assessment utilizes a decision tree model (USC 2005). 
Haimes and Horowitz, of the University of Virginia Center for Risk Management 
of Engineering Systems, define a “holistic approach for managing intelligence collection 
and analysis.”  The first component is a hierarchical, multi-objective, probabilistic, and 
dynamic input-output model that calculates the economic losses associated with attacks 
on particular targets.  The second component combines a hierarchical holographic model 
(HHM) and a two-player HHM game for information collection on target vulnerabilities 
based on expert opinion.  Risk filtering, ranking, and management (RFRM) is then 
employed to reduce the number of risk scenarios from the HHM.  A partitioned multi-
objective risk method (PMRM) analyzes the risks of extreme events.  The fifth and sixth 
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parts include a Bayesian analysis for adding value and capability to intelligence and a 
sequential decision-making process under uncertainty using the multi-objective decision 
tree (MODT).  Finally, Bayes’ theorem and Bellman’s principles of optimality define a 
resource allocation method for intelligence analysis (Haimes 2004). 
 The effect of misapplying quantitative, probabilistic techniques can create a 
dangerous illusion of strong security.  Good work has been done by Dean Wilkening in 
missile defense strategy development comparing shoot-look-shoot and barrage firing 
options (Wilkening 1998).  This work was based on extensive empirical data from test 
firing exercises and live military operations.  Unfortunately, much of the research that 
attempts to apply traditional risk models from electro-mechanical reliability engineering 
without experimental data to security problems suffers from serious flaws.  For the same 
reasons that these models are not applicable to system safety, they are also not applicable 
to system security, i.e. human factors, software issues, the influence of organizational 
culture, and design errors.  Additionally, security problems introduce an intelligent 
adversary – the threat is adaptive: 
In most applications of risk analysis, risk reduction actions follow the usual 
“80/20 rule” (originally due to Pareto) – the decision-maker can review a list of 
possible actions, ranked based on the magnitude of risk reduction per unit cost, 
and choose the most cost-effective, typically getting something on the order of 
80% of the benefit for perhaps 20% of the cost.  This does not work so well in 
the security context (especially if the attacker can readily observe system 
defenses), since the effectiveness of investments in defending one component can 
depend critically on whether other components have also been hardened (or, 
conversely, if the attacker can easily identify alternative targets that have not 
been hardened.  (Bier 2005) 
 
Questions of likelihood for rare events cannot be accurately estimated and expert 
judgment is often systemically biased.  Simplifying assumptions such as assuming that 
terrorist groups will only plan one method of attack are inconsistent with reality.  
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Furthermore, developing event or decision trees with mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive attack scenarios at each node can easily produce a tree that exceeds 
intellectual manageability.  Therefore, it is unlikely that reductionist, bottom-up 
approaches will succeed. 
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3.3  Game Theory 
 (Bier 2005) asserts that managing risks from intelligent adversaries is very 
different from other types of risk and suggests game theory over decision theory.  
Previous work in this area focused on “policy insights” such as the relative merits of 
deterrence and other protective measures (Frey 2003).  (Sandler 2003) presents a number 
of compelling reasons for the applicability of game theory to security problems: 
1. Game theory captures the strategic interactions between terrorists and a 
targeted government, where actions are interdependent and, thus, cannot be 
analyzed as though one side is passive. 
2. Strategic interactions among rational actors, who are trying to act according to 
how they think their counterparts will act and react, characterize the interface 
among terrorists or among alternative targets. 
3. In terrorist situations, each side issues threats and promises to gain a strategic 
advantage. 
4. Terrorists and governments abide by the underlying rationality assumption of 
game theory, where a player maximizes a goal subject to constraints. 
5. Game-theoretic notions of bargaining are applicable to hostage negotiations 
and terrorist campaign negotiations over demands. 
6. Uncertainty and learning in a strategic environment are relevant to all aspects 
of terrorism, in which the terrorists or government or both are not completely 
informed. 
 
However, game theory “requires strong assumptions about the availability of mutual 
information and the rationality of opponents.”  (Banks 2007)  As mentioned earlier, 
empirical work by (Tversky 1974) has shown that these assumptions often break down in 
reality.  Additionally, traditional games are organized to pursue a minimax solution for a 
two-person, zero-sum game.  However, as Banks and Anderson point out, such a model is 
only an approximation because defender and attacker will value successful and failed 
attacks differently (Banks 2007). 
 Many game-theory models of security carry the traditional, simplifying 
assumption that the probability of a successful terrorist attack on a location is a convex 
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function of the defensive resources.  Some security measures, such as relocating a facility 
to a more secure location, are inherently discrete.  Discretization introduces step changes 
into the function so there is no longer a smooth, convex function due to declining 
marginal returns on defensive investments.  Also, if a particular level of defensive 
investment completely deters an attack, the probability of terrorist success drops rapidly 
beyond that point.  This scenario would also produce a non-convex function in certain 
regions.  When non-convex functions are permitted, multiple local optima may emerge, 
thereby complicating the defense resource allocation problem (Bier 2005). 
In order to populate payoff matrices with values, statistical techniques from 
quantitative risk assessment are usually used (Banks 2007).  The problems identified in 
the previous session can create the following conundrum. 
 
Figure 7.  Propagation of Bad Assumptions. 
 
For example, given a Smallpox scenario, the following cost matrix could be defined: 
 
 No Attack Single Attack Multiple 
Attacks 
Stockpile Vaccine C11 C12 C13 
Biosurveillance C21 C22 C23 
Key Personnel C31 C32 C33 
Target 
Group for 
Vaccine 
Everyone C41 C42 C43 
 
Table 3.  Smallpox Payoff Matrix. 
Table Source (Banks 2007) 
 
Each Cij corresponds to payoffs (or costs) that would result from a particular combination 
of attack and defense.  Many factors go into the computation of the Cij, including an 
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estimate for the monetary value of human life, $2.86 million according to the US 
Department of Transportation.  However, a great deal of uncertainty persists: 
The total cost in each cell is a random variable.  These random variables are not 
independent, since components of the total cost are common to multiple cells.  
Thus it is appropriate to regard the entire game theory table as a multivariate 
random variable whose joint distribution is required for satisfactory analysis. 
(Banks 2007) 
 
If the minimax criterion is invoked for the normal-form game, the analyst 
assumes that the two players are unaware of the judgment made by their 
adversary until committed to a course of action.  Therefore, an extensive-form 
version of the game is created that uses the minimum expected loss criteria.  
Expert judgment populates the table below: 
 No Attack Single Attack Multiple 
Attacks 
Stockpile Vaccine 0.95 0.040 0.010 
Biosurveillance 0.96 0.035 0.005 
Key Personnel 0.96 0.039 0.001 
Target 
Group for 
Vaccine 
Everyone 0.99 0.005 0.005 
 
Table 4.  Baseline Probabilities of Attacks. 
Table Source (Banks 2007) 
 
Probabilities in Table 3 are multiplied by payoffs (or costs) in Table 2 and the results are 
summed along the rows.  At this point, the criterion chooses the defense, in this case a 
target group for the vaccine, with the minimum expected loss. 
One useful insight that a game-theoretic analysis can offer even if the 
payoff numbers are imprecise is problem framing.  For example, in a scenario 
where both the US and European Union (EU) are concerned about the threat of 
Iranian ballistic missile attack, three categories of games emerge: 
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 European Union 
United States Preempt Do not preempt 
Matrix a:  PRISONERS DILEMNA  
     Preempt 2, 2 -2, 4 
     Do not preempt 4, -2 Nash 0,0 
Matrix b:  asymmetric-dominance 
equilibrium 
 
     Preempt 6, 2 Nash 2, 4 
     Do not preempt 4, -2 0, 0 
Matrix c:  COORDINATION  
     Preempt Nash 2, 2 -4, 0 
     Do not preempt 0, -4 Nash 0,0 
 
Table 5.  Three Alternative Game Forms for Preemption. 
Table Source (Sandler 2003) 
 
In Matrix a, preemption by each country confers four in benefits on both countries 
at a cost of six to the country doing the preemption.   This creates a prisoners dilemma 
because an incentive exists for not taking action against the Iranian threat.  Matrix b 
represents a game where the US gains a net benefit for preempting as it is Iran’s preferred 
target.  Preemption costs six units while US preemption confers eight in benefits.  EU 
preemption credits four units to both parties.  As the authors point at, “This game 
representation may well characterize the US position after 9/11, where US action was 
going to yield high payoffs to the US government.”  (Sandler 2003)  However, another 
game is possible as shown in Matrix c.  Preemption by one nation may confer no reward 
and only imply a cost to the preemptor.  However, in a coordination game, joint 
preemption yields the greatest benefit to both nations.  Finally, as the three matrices 
indicate, Nash equilibriums arise whenever no player has anything to gain by changing 
only his strategy unilaterally.  For a related game that factors in a deterrence option, see 
(Arce M. 2005). 
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According to (Fricker 2005), game theory’s role in security focuses on analyses 
related to: 
1. Assessing strategies for how national antiterrorism expenditures, 
2. Measuring how military strategies encourage/discourage terrorism, 
3. Assessing insurance risks, and 
4. Evaluating the effects of focusing either on deterrence or preemption. 
 
As the list above indicates, game-theoretic models focus on strategic decision making.  
Questions of how to design and operate infrastructure systems that may be the target of 
terrorist attacks is the focus of the systems-theoretic analysis later in this thesis. 
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3.4  Red Teaming 
Red teaming is an excellent activity to complement other security analyses as well 
as reduce the complacency that often sets in after extended periods without attacks.  The 
goal of any red team is to challenge the plans, programs, and assumptions of the client 
organization.  Teams may challenge organizations at strategic, operational, or tactical 
levels depending on the area that needs the most attention.  The words of Dr. William 
Schneider, Jr., Chairman of the Defense Science Board, best capture the state of red 
teaming:  “Red teams can be a powerful tool to understand risks and increase options.  
However, the record of use of red teams in DoD is mixed at best.” (Schneider 2003)   
The greatest benefit derived from red teaming exercises is “hedging against 
catastrophic surprises.”  A good red team is capable of elucidating a deeper 
understanding of an adversary’s options, and identifying vulnerabilities in concepts, 
programs, plans, postures, and strategies.  Red teams also challenge “the accepted 
assumptions and accepted solutions” as well as identify inexperience.  They may function 
as surrogate adversaries, devil’s advocates, or simply as sources of independent 
judgment. 
Schneider also points out that “red teaming is important but it is not easy nor 
often done very well.”  He identifies the following causes of failure (Schneider 2003): 
The red team: 
1. Does not take its assignment seriously. 
2. Could lose its independence. 
3. Could be too removed from the decision making process. 
4. Could have inadequate interaction with the “blue” (team) and be viewed as 
just another sideline critic. 
5. Could destroy the integrity of the process and lose the confidence of decision 
makers by leaking its findings to outsiders. 
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Red team effectiveness is easily impaired by a corporate culture that does not value 
criticism and challenge, managers that do not want issues to arise that may “rock the 
boat,” dysfunctional interaction between red and blue teams, unqualified red team staff, 
and calling in a red team when the problem has grown out of control.  The red team must 
have independence with accountability as well as a process that enables the game results 
to be seriously considered by senior management (Schneider 2003). 
Unfortunately, the red teaming process failed miserably before 9/11/2001.  
Testimony by Bogdan Dzakovic, an FAA Red Team veteran, to the National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, on May 22, 2003, reveals how a good red 
team can become completely ineffective in the face of management resistance.  The 
Presidential Commission investigating the bombing of Pan Am 103 in 1990 created the 
FAA red teams that are in place today.  After the TWA 800 crash, Congress passed the 
FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996.  The law states that “…the Administrator [of FAA] 
shall conduct periodic and unannounced inspections of security systems of airports and 
air carriers to determine the effectiveness and vulnerabilities of such systems…”  Later, 
in 1997, a White House Commission stated that “…Red Team testing should also be 
increased by the FAA, and incorporated as a regular part of airport security action plans.  
Frequent, sophisticated attempts by these Red Teams to find ways to dodge security 
measures are an important part of finding weaknesses in the system and anticipating what 
sophisticated adversaries of our nation might attempt.”(Dzakovic 2003)   
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Unfortunately, as Dzakovic’s testimony indicates, the value of these red teams has 
been seriously undercut: 
Although we breached security with ridiculous ease up to 90% of the time, the 
FAA suppressed these warnings.  Instead we were ordered not to retest airports 
where we found particularly egregious vulnerabilities to see if the problems had 
been fixed.  Finally, the agency started providing advance notification of when 
we would be conducting our “undercover” tests and what we would be checking. 
(Dzakovic 2003) 
 
For example, in the late 1990s, over two-thirds of red teams breached airport security 
with firearms undetected.  This revelation led the FAA to stop testing with guns.  
According to Dzakovic, managers at the highest levels of the FAA chose to ignore 
warnings such as these:  “What happened on 9-11 was not a failure of the system, it was a 
system designed for failure.  FAA very consciously and deliberately orchestrated a 
dangerous façade of security.” (Dzakovic 2003) 
Compelling evidence existed prior to 9/11 of the likelihood and severity of this 
threat.  In testimony to the US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation Subcommittee on Aviation Security on April 6, 2000, the Associate 
Administrator of the FAA for Civil Aviation Security stated, “Moreover, members of 
foreign terrorist groups and representatives from state sponsors of terrorism are present in 
the United States.  There is evidence that a few foreign terrorist groups have well-
established capability and infrastructures here.” (Dzakovic 2003)  Additionally, many of 
the 9/11 hijackers were identified by the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening 
Systems (CAPPS).  CAPPS is a system that automatically researches anyone that buys an 
airplane ticket and generates a risk score based on a variety of factors.   
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The following hijackers were flagged by CAPPS: 
Hijacked Aircraft Terrorists 
American Airlines Flight 11 (Logan) Wail al-Shehri, Satam al-Suqami, Waleed 
al-Shehri, Mohamed Atta 
American Airlines Flight 77 (Dulles) Hani Hanjour, Khalid al-Mihdhar, Majed 
Moged, Nawaf al-Hazmi, Salem al-Hazmi 
United Airlines Flight 93 (Newark) Ahmad al-Haznawi 
United Airlines Flight 175 (Logan) None 
 
Table 6.  9/11 Terrorists Identified by CAPPS. 
Table Source (NCTAUS 2004a) 
 
Such a failure is not surprising when one learns that a FAA Security Special Agent wrote 
a letter to the Department of Transportation Inspect General in 1999 saying that 
“…Logan International Airport is in a critical state of non-compliance with Federal 
Aviation Security Regulations…” (NCTAUS 2004a) 
Can a security model be developed that does not rely on the assumptions of 
quantitative risk assessment, considers issues at a level closer to system design and 
operation compared to game theory, and supports successful red teaming?  According to 
(Haimes 2004): 
The authors of the chapter on complex and interdependent systems in a report by 
the National Research Council (2002) assert that “the basic tools of systems 
analysis and modeling are available today and are widely used in the military and 
industrial applications.  But these tools have severe limitations when applied to 
interdependent complex systems, and research is required to extend them.”  The 
report identifies the following needed initiatives, which should not be the domain 
of single disciplinary perspectives: 
• System-of-systems perspectives for homeland security. 
• Agent-based and system dynamics modeling 
 
A systems-theoretic approach that integrates system dynamics modeling is presented in 
the following chapter in an attempt to answer the question stated above. 
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CHAPTER 4:  Systems Theory and Complexity 
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4.1  STAMP 
 
Systems-Theoretic Accident Models and Process (STAMP) is an accident model 
based on systems and control theory created at MIT by Nancy Leveson.  Although 
originally developed for system safety engineering, many of the theory’s constructs are 
directly applicable to security.  Zipkin has shown the applicability of the model to 
malicious software (Zipkin 2005) and Laracy to biodefense planning (Laracy 2006).  The 
model with security extensions that is defined in this thesis is referred to as STAMP-Sec. 
4.2  Systems Theory 
Before explaining STAMP-Sec, it is important to understand its theoretical 
underpinning.  In contrast to the traditional scientific method that relies on analytic 
reduction, systems theory states that complex systems must be considered holistically.  
The theory was well developed by Bertalanffy, Ashby, and Wiener in the 1940s and 50s 
in response to challenges encountered in biology, communication, and control.  During 
this time, scientists and engineers began to recognize a new type of complexity.   
Organized simplicity is exhibited in traditional, deterministic systems that easily 
can be decomposed into subsystems and components such as in structural mechanics.  
The re-synthesis of the subsystems does not yield any unexpected properties because the 
component interactions are well defined and often linear.  Conversely, it is not 
straightforward or useful to decompose systems that exhibit unorganized complexity.  
However, statistical techniques are applicable because of the regularity and randomness 
that characterize the network structure.  The Law of Large Numbers becomes applicable 
and average values can be computed such as in statistical mechanics (e.g. ideal gases in 
chemistry).  The “new” complexity theory, organized complexity, describes systems with 
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a sufficiently complex structure to make it impractical or impossible for them to be 
modeled with analytic reduction, and not random enough to be modeled using statistics 
(Leveson 2002). 
 
Figure 8.  System Organization and Complexity. 
Image Source (Weinberg 1975) 
Systems characterized by organized complexity exhibit strong, non-linear interactions 
and coupling between subsystems and components.  Therefore, a top-down approach 
needs to be applied to such systems.  Two underlying concepts provide insight into these 
complex systems:   emergence/hierarchy and communication/control. 
Abstractions for complex systems often involve layers.  In the case where the 
abstraction is hierarchical, the level of organization increases as one moves toward higher 
layers.  Additionally, the step from level n to n + 1 yields new properties that are not 
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discernable at level n.  This phenomenon is referred to as emergence, or emergent 
properties.  Leveson provides a good example of this behavior using an apple’s shape:  
“The shape of an apple, although eventually explainable in terms of the cells of the apple, 
has no meaning at that lower level of description.”(Leveson 2002)  Security is an 
emergent system property.  For example, it is not possible to completely evaluate the 
security of an individual personal computer in isolation.  The security of a PC can only be 
determined by its relationship within a broader context, i.e. a socio-technical system.  A 
PC might be considered “secure” when it is sitting isolated at home.  However, once that 
computer is brought to work, connected to the LAN, and therefore the Internet, a whole 
new class of vulnerabilities emerges.  An individual computer may be bolted to a desk, 
require a boot-up password, and have an encrypted file system.  However, a security 
expert would never classify such as system as “totally secure.”  This is because security is 
a system property.  A computer network is more than the sum of individual PCs, the 
behavior of the PCs in isolation does not tell us all the possible behaviors it may exercise 
in connection with other computers, and the performance of a network cannot be 
characterized by a simple additive composition of PCs. 
As Graham, Baliga, and Kumar point out, over the last 50 years, the fields of 
communications, control, and computation have converged (Graham 2004).  The 
resulting theoretical foundations are contained in systems theory and directly relevant to 
the goals of system safety and security.  One especially sees the need for communications 
to coordinate required control in open systems (Leveson 2002).  Control is exercised in 
complex systems by imposing constraints on lower levels in the hierarchy.  According to 
Peter Checkland: 
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Control is always associated with the imposition of constraints, and an account of 
a control process necessarily requires our taking into account at least two 
hierarchical levels.  At a given level, it is often possible to describe the level by 
writing dynamical equations, on the assumption that one particle is representative 
of the collection and that the forces at other levels do not interfere.  But any 
description of a control process entails an upper layer imposing constraints upon 
the lower.  The upper level is a source of an alternative description of the lower 
level in terms of specific function that are emergent as a result of the imposition 
of constraints (Checkland 1981). 
 
Ashby provides four conditions that are required to exercise control over a system: 
• Goal condition – The controller must have a goal or goals. 
• Action condition – The controller must be able to affect the state of the 
system. 
• Model condition – The controller must be (or contain) a model of the 
system. 
• Observability condition – The controller must be able to ascertain the state 
of the system. (Ashby 1956) 
 
The controller in Leveson’s generic control loop must be able to observe the controlled 
process through the sensors, relate the observation to its model, and actuate the process if 
the system has deviated from the goal condition. 
 
Figure 9.  Generic Control Loop. 
Image Source (Leveson 2002) 
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4.3  Systems Thinking 
 
 Systems thinking is the application of systems theory to mental models and 
thought.  It acknowledges that learning is a feedback process and views problems through 
the lens of interconnected networks governed by systems of non-linear relationships.  
System thinkers advocate holism over the traditional reductionism found in modern 
science.  Operations Researcher, Russell Ackoff, and Computer Engineer, Jay Forrester, 
developed the approach in the late 1950s in response to challenges encountered in 
studying complex, socio-technical systems.  Forrester created the System Dynamics 
modeling technique, which is based on the theory of non-linear dynamics.  His successors 
include Peter Senge, who applies systems thinking to organizational learning (Senge 
2006), and John Sterman, the leader of the system dynamics community who uses it to 
improve managerial decision-making in complex systems (Sterman 2000).   
Ackoff’s system thinking is best understood as carrying on the spirit of 
Operations Research as it was practiced in the 1950s and 60s before mathematical 
methods overtook problem framing and formulation as the forte of OR specialists (Kirby 
2003).  Ackoff’s successor is Jamshid Gharajedaghi, the leader of the Interactive Design 
(ID) movement.  ID focuses on human choice in socio-technical systems and incorporates 
iterative inquiry and operational thinking.  Iterative inquiry theory suggests that to gain 
understanding in complex systems, a successive technique of investigating function, 
structure, process, and context can lead to greater understanding. 
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Figure 10.  Iterative Inquiry. 
Image Source (Gharajedaghi 2004) 
 
Operational thinking requires a systems scientist to think about how systems actually 
work as opposed to how they could theoretically work.  Non-operational thinking is best 
captured in econometric models that seek to predict milk consumption but do not factor 
in cows (Richmond 1993).  Overall, ID advocates participatory design and offers an 
approach both for formulating problems and developing solutions in teams (Gharajedaghi 
1999).   
In Britain, Peter Checkland developed another systems thinking approach for 
modeling organizational processes and managing change in complex social systems 
called the Soft Systems Methodology (SSM)  (Checkland 1981).  SSM is a qualitative 
technique that seeks to impose systems thinking in non-systemic situations where human 
social activity is more important that other factors such as technology.  Conceptual 
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models and graphics are developed to promote deeper understanding of the complex 
social system. 
Systems thinking has yielded significant results in the Engineering Systems 
Division at MIT.  In particular, it has proven to be very useful for the investigation of 
cultural and organizational factors that jeopardize the safety of complex engineering 
systems (Dulac 2007c).  This thesis research will show that system thinking insights are 
equally as applicable to security problems. 
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CHAPTER 5:  System Theoretic Accident Models and 
Processes for Security (STAMP-Sec) 
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5.1  STAMP-Sec 
 
STAMP-Sec views security incidents as the result of inadequate control, rather 
than strictly a failure, such as a cryptographic device breaking (Rae 2006) or a code 
cracked.  Security is an emergent property that is achieved through the enforcement of 
constraints.  This perspective allows security problems to be transformed into control 
problems for which powerful tools can be employed.  Control structures are defined to 
capture the communication and control in the system and illustrate the presence and 
absence of feedback.  They are hierarchal in nature and need to be constructed both for 
system development and system operation.   
Security must be designed into a system as well as be part of how it is operated.  
Historical examples of large systems where security was added in “after the fact” have 
been plagued by systemic security risks.  For example, current approaches to information 
security suffers from serious deficiencies as evidenced by the influence of SPAM, 
Internet worms, viruses, phishing, and other attacks that plague the common Internet 
user.  This is largely a result of the fact that network research in the 1960s through the 
1980s focused on achieving performance (e.g. throughput and robustness) objectives with 
little emphasis on security.  As a result, when threats began to emerge in the 1990s, 
Internet security was approached from an ad-hoc perspective – applying patches to 
vulnerabilities already identified by attackers.  The problem remains that the underlying 
architecture was not designed to support strong security.   
A STAMP control structure informs design by defining the necessary 
communication and control between subsystems and components to enforce security 
constraints.  Effective communication between levels of the hierarchy is essential to 
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successful system security.  Layer n + 1 must be able to assert goals, policies, and 
constraints through a reference channel and layer n must be able to communicate 
operational experience through a measuring channel. 
 
Figure 11.  Communication and Control in Layered Systems. 
Image Source (Leveson 2002) 
 In a top-down security engineering activity, threat analyses may be conducted 
using a variant of STPA, (STAMP-based Analysis).  Threats that the system must guard 
against are identified and constraints are defined that prevent their instantiation as a result 
of design or operational decisions.  The complete list of constraints should be part of a 
system’s requirements document.  After that, the static control structure is modeled.  
Components in the control structure are assigned responsibility to maintain the 
constraints. Finally, possible control actions  for the components are defined (Leveson 
2003).  System Dynamics is used to understand how the control structure and the 
malicious actor could evolve.   
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The five steps of STAMP-Sec are provided below. 
STAMP-Sec 
1. Identify the system level threats. 
2. Write security constraints for the threats. 
3. Define the static control structure to prevent or mitigate the threats. 
a. Assign constraints to the system components responsible for 
implementing them. 
b. Define the control actions for the components that prevent or 
mitigate the threats. 
4. Identify inadequate control actions that could lead to an insecure state. 
5. Determine ways that constraints could be violated and attempt to 
eliminate them.  In particular, use System Dynamics to consider how and 
why the security control structure might change over time, potentially 
leading to ineffective controls. 
Figure 12.  STAMP-Sec Methodology. 
 
5.2  STAMP-Sec for an Air Transportation System                                                               
In “The Law of Loopholes in Action,” David Gelernter argues that “every 
loophole will eventually be exploited; every loophole will eventually be closed.” 
(Gelernter 2005)  According to (Fricker 2005): 
The effect of the Law of Loopholes, as anyone that flies regularly today knows, 
is an ever-expanding set of security measures and requirements put in place, 
generally in response to past security breaches.  Such rules and requirements are 
useful for helping prevent a reoccurrence of a particular incident.  But, to the 
extent a determined adversary’s focus is on causing destruction and mayhem, 
these types of rules and requirements simply mean that as one loophole is 
plugged the adversary shifts its attention and energies to looking for and then 
trying to exploit a different loophole.”  
 
Instead of participating in the Law of Loopholes game, a STAMP-based analysis takes a 
top-down approach to proactively design and operate systems to meet security 
requirements and prevent the instantiation of system-level threats.  Air transportation 
systems must control against the following threats: 
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1. A terrorist takes control of or disrupts an aircraft or persons onboard. 
2. A terrorist takes control of or impersonates air traffic control. 
3. A terrorist sabotages an aircraft. 
4. A terrorist shoots an aircraft down. 
5. A terrorist disrupts the critical infrastructure of the air transportation system (e.g. 
destroy a runway or radar). 
6. A terrorist interferes with the aircraft communication, navigation, or surveillance 
systems. 
 
However, before a threat assessment of the Next Generation Air Transportation System is 
conducted, the existing socio-technical control structure must be analyzed. It is useful to 
understand the lessons of 9/11 and keep them in mind in the evolution toward NGATS.  
For a timeline of background and proximal events leading to the attack in 2001, see 
Appendix I. 
 The reconstruction of a security incident begins with identifying the threat carried 
out by the attacker as well as the constraints that were violated.  After that, the taxonomy 
of inadequate controls is used to identify the dysfunctional interactions that enabled the 
violation of security constraints.  In general, for each component in the control structure, 
the following items are provided (Leveson 2002): 
1. Constraints 
2. Controls 
3. Context 
a. Roles and Responsibilities 
b. Environmental and Behavior Shaping Factors 
4. Flaws in the Controlled Process 
5. Dysfunctional Interactions, Failures, Flawed Decisions, and Erroneous Control 
Actions 
6. Reasons for Flawed Control Actions and Dysfunctional Interactions 
a. Control Algorithm Flaws 
b. Incorrect Process, Interface, or Mental Models 
c. Inadequate Coordination among Multiple Controllers 
d. Reference Channel Flaws 
e. Feedback Flaws 
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This model is a useful tool to understand how and why the security constraints were 
violated. 
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5.2.1  Security on 9/11/2001 
 
The security control structure for air transportation in the US in 2001 is shown 
below.  The red, dotted lines indicate instances of inadequate communication and control. 
 
Figure 13.  Security Control Structure on 9/11/2001. 
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Airport Security 
In 2001, private companies were contracted to perform the passenger and baggage 
screening function at US Airports.  Airports and carriers provided policies, resources, and 
instructions, but a clear line of accountability was not present to ensure that these 
directives were successfully executed. 
Security Constraint Violated:  Security personnel must remove passengers that 
are judged to be a risk to the air transportation system and contact law 
enforcement officials.  
 
Controls:  Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening Systems (CAPPS), 
verification of ID, metal detectors, and X-Ray bag screening were the 
primary controls in place to enforce the constraint. 
 
Context:  The FBI and FAA were responsible for administering CAPPS.  Those 
tagged by the system would then be subject to more rigorous baggage 
screening for explosives.  CAPPS did not specify special screening of the 
passengers themselves.   
 
Flaws in the Controlled Process:  CAPPS, and the passenger screening system 
in general, did not have a specified mechanism to prevent high risk 
passengers from boarding an aircraft. 
 
Dysfunctional Interactions, Failures, Flawed Decisions, and Erroneous 
Control Actions:  At Logan International Airport, Wail al-Shehri and 
Satam al-Suqami were chosen for special screening of their checked bags, 
before they boarded American Airlines Flight 11.  CAPPS identified 
Waleed al-Shehri but he did not check any luggage.  Portland Airport 
identified Mohamed Atta.  The hijackers of AA Flight 77, Hani Hanjour, 
Khalid al-Mihdhar, and Majed Moqed were also identified by CAPPS.  
Nawaf al-Hazmi and Salem al-Hazmi were chosen because of insufficient 
identification.  United Airlines Flight 93’s hijacker, Ahmad al-Haznawi, 
was flagged but none of the hijackers of United Airlines Flight 175 were 
identified by CAPPS (NCTAUS 2004b). 
 
Reasons for Flawed Control Actions and Dysfunctional Interactions:  US 
airliners had not been hijacked in over a decade and a false sense of 
security was present.  In the late 1990s, a Fox News/Opinion Dynamics 
poll indicated that 78% of Americans surveyed thought poor maintenance 
was “a greater threat to airlines safety” than terrorism.  Also, increasing 
demand for flights led airliners to focus on changes to the system that 
improved throughput.  The “Passenger Bill of Rights” emphasized 
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providing a convenient and efficient passenger experience.  According to 
statements from the 9/11 Commission, “Domestic hijacking in particular 
seemed like a thing of the past.” (NCTAUS 2004b)  Finally, screeners 
have a very monotonous job and are paid a low wage.  These 
environmental conditions do not enable motivated, diligent execution of 
duties. 
 
Airport Operations / Airlines Management 
In 2001, US airports did not have any operational authority over checkpoint 
screening activities.  With the airports lacking the jurisdiction to enforce FAA 
regulations, only the airlines were empowered to manage the passenger screening 
process. 
Security Constraint Violated:  Airlines shall ensure that passenger screening 
companies comply with all FAA regulations and take additional measures 
to prevent passengers that pose a risk to the Air Transportation System 
from boarding an aircraft.  
 
Controls:  The airlines two principal control actions were sharing threat 
information with screeners and enforcing regulations. 
 
Context:  Airports and airlines knew that passenger screening was not effective 
from red teaming exercises and other assessments. 
 
Flaws in the Controlled Process:  The regulations that the airlines enforced were 
incapable of implementing the security constraint.  Federal regulations 
stated that airlines were required to “conduct screening…to prevent or 
deter the carriage aboard airplanes of any explosive, incendiary, or a 
deadly or dangerous weapon on or about each individual’s person or 
accessible property, and the carriage of any explosive or incendiary in 
checked baggage.” (NCTAUS 2004b)  Inherently dangerous persons nor 
box cutters are mentioned here. 
 
Dysfunctional Interactions, Failures, Flawed Decisions, and Erroneous 
Control Actions:  With the exception of guns, large knives, and bombs, 
the FAA simply told airliners to “use common sense” in establishing 
screening regulations.  The airlines responded to this suggestion by 
working together to create the “Checkpoint Operations Guide,” which was 
later approved by the FAA.  Box cutters were listed as restricted items and 
not permitted to be brought in the cabin.  Obviously, the carriers did not 
enforce the Checkpoint Operations Guide. 
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Reasons for Flawed Control Actions and Dysfunctional Interactions:  Utility 
knives with blades less than four inches were permitted in the cabin.  The 
Checkpoint Operations Guide did not provide information about the 
difference between a pocket knife and a box cutter.  A culture of “passing 
the buck” between the FAA and the airlines created an ambiguous guide 
that was then not taken seriously by airport screeners. 
 
Federal Aviation Administration 
The FAA was the principle regulatory agency of the Air Transportation System in 
2001.  It possessed the statutory authority to issue and enforce aircraft and airport 
security rules and procedures. 
Security Constraint Violated:  The FAA shall issue directives to airlines, 
airports, and security screening companies that prevent the hijacking of an 
aircraft. 
 
Controls:  The FAA security system imposed control through a seven layered 
defense: 
1. Intelligence 
2. Passenger Screening 
3. Airport Access Control 
4. Passenger Checkpoint Screening 
5. Passenger Checked Baggage Screening 
6. Cargo Screening 
7. On-board Security 
 
As with any layered defense, a hierarchy is present starting with Level 1.  
The goal of this system was to use intelligence to remove threats from the 
system before they arrived at an airport.  In the event that the first six 
layers were breached, on-board security, i.e. air marshals, was the last line 
of defense. 
 
Context:  The FAA leadership focused on air transportation economics, customer 
service, and safety issues.  Security was not a large concern.  The civil 
aviation system was at the equivalent of a Threat Level Yellow.  This 
intermediate threat level was to be invoked when “Information indicates 
that a terrorist group or other hostile entity with a known capability of 
attacking civil aviation is likely to carry out attacks against US targets; or 
civil disturbances with a direct impact on civil aviation have begun or are 
imminent.”  (NCTAUS 2004b) 
 
Flaws in the Controlled Process:  Two principle flaws were present.  First, the 
FAA did not have the 9/11 hijackers in their database of high risk 
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passengers on the no-fly list.  In fact, only twelve terrorists were in the 
database.  The State Department’s TIPOFF database contained 61,000 
terrorists include two 9/11 hijackers.  Second, the FAA did not certify 
screening companies in accordance with the requirements set forth in the 
FAA Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 and the 1997 Gore 
Commission.   
 
Dysfunctional Interactions, Failures, Flawed Decisions, and Erroneous 
Control Actions:  FAA security analysts did not recognize an increased 
threat to domestic air transportation due to dysfunctional interactions with 
intelligence agencies.  “Civil aviation security officials testified that the 
FAA felt blind when it came to assessing the domestic threat because of 
lack of intelligence on what was going on in the American homeland as 
opposed to overseas.” (NCTAUS 2004b)  The FBI, CIA, and State 
Department intelligence shared with the FAA focused on threats in the 
Middle East despite the fact that these agencies had data on domestic risks 
(e.g. Phoenix memo).  Erroneous controls were also exercised.  Instead of 
implementing anti-hijacking procedures in response to the heightened 
threat level in the spring and summer of 2001, the FAA only issued 
“general warnings to the industry to be more vigilant and cautious.” 
(NCTAUS 2004b)  Additionally, many flawed decisions resulted from 
dysfunctional interactions between the FAA and the airlines in the 
development of the “common sense” screening guidelines. 
 
Reasons for Flawed Control Actions and Dysfunctional Interactions:  
Inadequate coordination among stakeholders is a major reason for the 
dysfunctional interactions in the FAA.  FAA intelligence officers were 
granted liaison status with the FBI, CIA, and State Department 
intelligence divisions concerned with aviation security.  However, the 
FAA did not obtain key information from these organizations.  
Additionally, a feedback flaw was present because liaisons were not 
assigned to the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA).  More generally, a feedback flaw was present 
because operational experience and threat assessments were not used to 
develop proactive policies.  Rather, the features of the civil aviation 
security system were the result of responding to specific historical 
incidents. 
 
Department of Transportation 
The Department of Transportation (DoT) is a cabinet level executive department 
concerned with all areas of transportation.  In addition to the FAA, it administers the 
Federal Highway Administration, Federal Railroad Administration, Maritime 
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Administration, St. Lawrence Seaway, and other transportation related agencies in the 
government.  According to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) mission statement, 
“The Office of Inspector General works within the Department of Transportation to 
promote effectiveness and head off, or stops, waste, fraud and abuse in departmental 
programs. We do this through audits and investigations. OIG also consults with the 
Congress about programs in progress and proposed new laws and regulations.”  
Unfortunately, it is now apparent that neither the DoT nor the OIG was diligently 
performing its duties with regard to aviation security in 2001. 
Security Constraint Violated:  The DoT shall execute federal laws pertaining to 
transportation security and empower constituent agencies to enact 
regulations to achieve security goals. 
 
Controls:  The DoT exercised two primary control actions for transportation 
security.  First, it was responsible for providing the necessary resources, 
directives, and leadership to the FAA.  Second, it was responsible for 
suggesting legislative action if necessary changes to the security of the 
ATS required Congressional approval. 
 
Context:  The vulnerabilities in the ATS were well documented in unclassified 
reports from the DoT Inspector General and the General Accounting 
Office.  Additionally, the results were published by the media. 
 
Flaws in the Controlled Process:  In its administration of the FAA, and its 
interactions with the Congress, the leadership of the DoT did not 
emphasize the well documented weaknesses of the ATS. 
 
Dysfunctional Interactions, Failures, Flawed Decisions, and Erroneous 
Control Actions:  Incident and change reports, security assessments, and 
whistle blowers were unable to successfully communicate concerns to 
DoT leadership.  The OIG did not provide the necessary oversight that its 
mission requires.  According to Red Team leader and whistleblower 
Bogdan Dzakovic, “I went to the Department of Transportation’s OIG.  
This too proved to be a wasted effort.  A senior official in the Inspector 
Generals Office actually explained to us that because of the political 
situation between the FAA and the IG’s office, the IG couldn’t take any 
action against the FAA.” (Dzakovic 2003) 
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Reasons for Flawed Control Actions and Dysfunctional Interactions:  
Efficiency and economy were priorities at the DoT.  The leadership’s 
mental models with regard to security were satisfied with the illusion of 
security. 
 
Congress 
Congress passed the FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996.  The law states that 
“…the Administrator [of the FAA] shall conduct periodic and unannounced inspections 
of security systems of airports and air carriers to determine the effectiveness and 
vulnerabilities of such systems…”  Unfortunately, as described above, the red teaming 
process was rendered impotent and additional legislative action was not taken to 
strengthen the security of the ATS. 
Security Constraint Violated:  Congress shall pass laws to strength the security 
of the Air Transportation System.  The GAO shall investigate the 
execution of these laws and report its findings to the Congress. 
 
Controls:  Congress exercises control by soliciting government reports and 
conducting hearing and finally passing legislation based on these inputs. 
 
Context:  Although whistleblowers were not given adequate access to the 
Legislative branch, Congress was not ignorant of the terrorist threat to the 
ATS.  In testimony to the US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation Subcommittee on Aviation Security on April 6, 2000, 
the Associate Administrator of the FAA for Civil Aviation Security stated, 
“Moreover, members of foreign terrorist groups and representatives from 
state sponsors of terrorism are present in the Unite States.  There is 
evidence that a few foreign terrorist groups have well-established 
capability and infrastructures here.” (Dzakovic 2003) 
 
Flaws in the Controlled Process:  The Congress did not hold the DoT or the 
FAA accountable for not complying with their statutory obligations.  
Blatant violation of federal law such as the fact that the FAA was not 
certifying passenger screening companies, as well as obstructing red 
teams, were permitted. 
 
Dysfunctional Interactions, Failures, Flawed Decisions, and Erroneous 
Control Actions:  Dysfunctional interactions between the Congress and 
its investigate arm, the GAO, enabled the DoT to continue to persist in a 
state of noncompliance to federal statutes.  The GAO had the necessary 
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data to make a strong case for Congressional intervention, but failed to do 
so.  “The GAO people we spoke to were extremely concerned about our 
revelations, but explained they have no authority to actually do anything.” 
(Dzakovic 2003) 
 
Reasons for Flawed Control Actions and Dysfunctional Interactions:  
Reference channel as well as feedback flaws contributed to the 
dysfunctional interaction. The flaws were both FAA noncompliance and 
the inability for whistleblowers to establish a line of communication to an 
empowered individual in the Congress. 
 
5.2.2  Summary of Inadequate Controls in the ATS 
 
There are many ways inadequate control can lead to a security system being 
compromised.  STAMP provides a useful categorization scheme that captures most safety 
control flaws.  Broadly, they fall into one of three categories:  Inadequate enforcement of 
constraints, inadequate execution of control actions, or inappropriate or missing feedback 
(Leveson 2004).  The introduction of a malicious agent does not violate the assumption 
of the taxonomy originally developed for safety.  In a safety scenario, poor engineering or 
management may offer inadequate enforcement of constraints, execution of control 
actions, or feedback such that a hazard that is “exploited” inadvertently in system 
operations.  In a security scenario, poor engineering or management may offer inadequate 
enforcement of constraints, execution of control actions, or feedback such that a 
vulnerability is created that may be intentionally exploited in system operation.  Whether 
one is concerned with safety or security, the problem is inadequate control.  STAMP-Sec 
extends the safety list to capture security issues:   
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1. Inadequate Enforcement of Constraints (Control Actions) 
1.1. Unidentified threats 
1.2. Inappropriate, ineffective, or missing control actions for identified threats 
1.2.1. Design of control process does not enforce constraints 
1.2.1.1.Flaws in creation process 
1.2.1.2.Process changes without appropriate change in control (asynchronous 
evolution) 
1.2.1.3.Incorrect modification or adaptation 
1.2.2. Process models inconsistent, incomplete, or incorrect 
1.2.2.1.Flaws in creation process 
1.2.2.2.Flaws in updating process (asynchronous evolution) 
1.2.2.3.Time lags and measurement inaccuracies not accounted for 
1.2.3. Inadequate coordination among controllers and decision makers (boundary 
and overlap areas) 
2. Inadequate Execution of Control Action 
2.1. Communication flaw 
2.2. Inadequate actuator operation 
2.3. Time lag 
3. Inadequate or missing feedback 
3.1. Not provided in system/organizational design 
3.2. Communication flaw 
3.3. Time lag 
3.4. Inadequate detection mechanisms 
 
The reader should take note that many of these inadequacies are not associated with 
simply an event-based risk.  Rather, flaws in communication and control as well as time 
lags and flaws in the design process contribute to threats. 
5.2.3  Security After 9/11/2001 
Now that the STAMP framework has been used to understand the attack of 
9/11/2001, one can begin to study the Air Transportation System of 2007.  Improvements 
have certainly been made over the last six years.  The creation of the Terrorism Threat 
Integration Center, a more vigilant civil defense program, an improved port and 
commercial shipping inspection program, hardened cockpits, and other changes have 
changed the security landscape.  As a result, over 100 attacks have been thwarted since 
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9/11 (NCTAUS 2004a).  This is due to improvements in the security of the ATS as well 
as increased “human vigilance, unprecedented law enforcement, security, and intelligence 
cooperation, and the worldwide hunt for Al Qaeda, denying the group time, space, and 
resources to plan and mount spectacular attacks.” (RMS 2003)   
However, this is certainly not the time for complacency to set in.  According to 
the State Department, Al Qaeada (Sunni Islamists), Hizballah (Shia Islamists), Al 
Gama’a Al-Isalamiyya (Egyptian Islamists), Kahane Chai (Israeli extremists), Mujahdein 
e-Khalq (Marxist-Islamists) are believed to be operating in the US.  Fortunately, many of 
the major flaws in the control processes and the dysfunctional interactions identified 
above have been corrected.  The current operations control structure for the US is shown 
below. 
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Figure 14.  Post 9/11 Security Control Structure. 
 
Congress 
The House Committee on Homeland Security; Subcommittee on Transportation 
Security and Infrastructure Protection, and the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation; Subcommittee on Aviation Safety, Operations, and Security have 
oversight over US non-military air transportation.  In the post 9/11 political climate, the 
Congress is very receptive and willing to hear the testimony of whistleblowers and 
critique security assessments and government reports with professionals on their own 
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staffs.  Additionally, concerns from the GAO on the topic of aviation security would 
receive much greater priority than in the pre 9/11 environment that Bogdan Dzakovic 
encountered. 
Department of Transportation 
 The DoT has been stripped of its lead role in transportation security.  While it still 
administers the FAA, DoT no longer controls passenger and cargo screening.  As a result, 
the DoT’s priorities of passenger/cargo throughput and transportation economics no 
longer directly affect ATS security.  It is not known whether the political situation 
between the DoT OIG that prevented disciplinary actions from being taken against the 
FAA has improved. 
Department of Homeland Security and the TSA 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established on November 25 
by the Homeland Security Act of 2002.  This decision introduced organizational 
complexity to the ATS because two executive departments share control of the ATS.  The 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was created to replace the private 
companies that airlines contracted to perform passenger and baggage screening.  As a 
part of DHS, the Administrator of the TSA is an Assistant Secretary of Homeland 
Security.  With a cabinet level department focused on security, there is greater likelihood 
that poor red team results and whistleblowers will not be ignored.  Additionally, the TSA 
imposes security policies, shares security resources, and informs work instructions for the 
airports and airlines.  While the transformation of passenger screening from a private 
entity to the government does not necessarily improve security, it is preferable to have 
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the screening organization reporting to the DHS rather than the airlines. DHS can impose 
the necessary control on TSA without being concerned about airline profitability.   
Federal Aviation Administration 
The FAA ensures that Federal Law and DoT policies are enforced in the air 
transportation system.  The FAA also enforces regulations and standards on the airlines 
and airports and has the power to impose sanctions and raise issues to the DoT.  The 
control flaws resulting from dysfunctional interactions between the FAA intelligence 
organization and other Federal intelligence agencies is no longer an area of major 
concern.  Responsibility for terrorist intelligence is now located within the Department of 
Homeland Security and TSA.  As part of this effort, the CAPPS program has been 
expanded and strengthened to identify terrorists and prevent them from boarding aircraft.  
It is expected that the new program, Secure Flight, will be deployed in 2010 (EPIC 2006). 
All in all, the restructuring of the security control structure for air transportation appears 
to have addressed many of the proximate causes of the attack on September 11, 2001 
having to do with inadequate control in the socio-technical system. 
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5.2.4  Evolution to the Next Generation Air Transportation Systems 
The pressing question that arises in the context of developing NGATS is:  
How can the JPDO evolve the current systems such that security does not 
degrade and perhaps even improves?  
 
(Dulac 2007a) has shown that the transition of a complex system from an operations 
environment to one that includes development introduces significant risks.  Therefore, it 
is important that as the US transitions to the NGATS, the required communication and 
control from the earlier system is maintained and additional constraints are imposed to 
satisfy new security requirements.  In order to achieve this objective, a high level model 
of socio-technical control is provided below. 
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Figure 15.  NGATS Socio-Technical Control Structure. 
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Risks emerge in a system when “basic inadequacies in the way individual 
components in the control structure fulfill their responsibilities” or when the 
“coordination of activities and decision-making can lead to unintended interactions and 
consequences.” (Leveson 2005)  Therefore, the components in the control structure above 
will be analyzed to identify these risks.  In general, a controller can provide four types of 
inadequate control (Leveson 2002): 
1. A required control action is not provided. 
2. An incorrect control action is provided. 
3. A potentially correct or adequate control action is provided too late (at the wrong 
time). 
4. A correct control action is stopped too soon. 
 
The four inadequate controls are applied to the component responsibilities below to 
prevent poor engineering and management decision-making from enabling an attack. 
Congress 
In order for legislation to be maximally effective in the area of security, 
legislators must be well informed of policy level security issues in the form of hearings, 
executive department reports, and security incident reports.  The fundamental role of the 
Congress in air transportation operations does not change appreciably with the transition 
to NGATS.  However, some additional roles are added for the development portion of 
NGATS.   
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Item Responsibility Inadequate Control 
Congress 
Congress does not pass adequate legislation to 
effectively address security issues. 
Congress passes legislation that is detrimental to 
security issues. 
Congress passes legislation only after an attack 
has occurred. 
1 Pass legislation affecting NGATS 
Congress succumbs to pressure and amends or 
removes laws necessary to address security 
issues. 
Congress' budget inadequately funds the system 
so control actions are inappropriate, ineffective, or 
missing. 
Congress' budget funds aspects of the system 
that do not improve security or are detrimental to 
it. 
Congress' budget is not passed on time or does 
not provide forward-thinking plans. 
2 Approve NGATS budget 
Congress' budget withdraws funding for security 
engineering during the development of the 
system. 
Congress approves executive leadership that is 
incompetent or does not consider security a high 
priority. 
Congress approves executive leadership that 
opposes strong security. 
Congress approves executive leadership only 
after an attack has occurred. 
3 Approve senior leadership appointments 
Congress interferes with the operation of the 
executive branch and disrupts security decision-
making. 
 
Table 7.  Inadequate Controls for Congress. 
 
 Page 81 of 133 
Executive and Regulatory Agencies, Industry Associations, and Unions 
  The next level in the control structure includes government regulatory agencies, 
industry associations, unions, courts, and other stakeholders which exert control over 
airports and airlines.  They receive information from certification reports, incident 
reports, and whistleblowers.  The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), NOAA’s 
Aviation Weather Service, Air Line Pilots’ Association (ALPA), Flight Safety 
Foundation (FSF), National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO), Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), 
International Federation of Air Line Pilots Association (IFAPA), Professional Air Traffic 
Controller Organization (PATCO), International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers’ 
Association (IFATCA), and International Air Transport Association (IATA) all influence 
the creation of standards, regulations, and certifications.  
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Figure 16.  Current Airline/Airport Control Structure. 
 
Above is a control structure diagram showing the lines of communication and 
control for the airlines and airports in the pre-NGATS environment.  As the system 
evolves and NGATS is implemented, it is important that security-critical feedback is not 
lost.  For example, the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) plays an 
important role by synthesizing the interests and advice of industry associations, unions, 
airlines, airports, and governmental entities and developing policy and regulatory advice 
for the FAA to influence the airlines and airports.  The alignment of stakeholders on 
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security objectives is essential to success.  Key responsibilities and risks are shown 
below. 
 
Item Responsibility Inadequate Control 
Executive Departments and Agencies 
DHS regulations and procedures have not 
identified important vulnerabilities or threats. 
DHS regulations and procedures create new 
vulnerabilities and threats. 
DHS regulations and procedures are only issued 
after an attack has occurred. 
4 Issue security regulations and procedures 
DHS regulations and procedures are rescinded in 
response to external pressure. 
FAA does not receive necessary policy and 
regulatory advice from the RTCA and proper 
administration from the DoT. 
RTCA advice and DoT administration interferes 
with the FAA’s ability to issue guidelines, 
regulations, and air traffic rules that promote 
strong security. 
RTCA advice and DoT administration are not 
provided to the FAA until after an attack has 
occurred. 
5 Issue flight guidelines, aviation regulations, and air traffic rules 
RTCA advice and DoT administration are not 
present during a critical period. 
Senior leadership lacks competence or places 
minimal priority on security issues and therefore 
does not adequately implement the security 
strategy. 
Senior leadership intentionally disrupts the security 
strategy. 
Senior leadership does not exercise good 
judgment or place priority on security issues in the 
period before an attack. 
6 
Provide leadership for the 
development and operation of 
NGATS 
Senior leadership stops providing competent 
judgment and making security a priority due to 
external pressure. 
 
Table 8.  Inadequate Controls for Executive Agencies. 
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Airlines, Airports, Development Companies, and the JPDO 
Airlines, airports, communication companies, and others involved with the 
development of engineering systems associated with NGATS influence the JPDO by 
developing security policies, defining standards, and allocating resources.  They have 
three principle responsibilities: 
 
Item Responsibility Inadequate Control 
Airlines and Airports 
Industry associations do not provide necessary 
concerns, reports, best practices, and independent 
analysis. 
Industry associations provide concerns, reports, 
practices, and analysis that are not focused on 
improving security. 
Industry associations do not provide necessary 
concerns, reports, best practices, and independent 
analysis on time. 
7 Define the security policies 
Industry associations stop providing necessary 
concerns, reports, best practices, and independent 
analysis due to pressure from constituencies. 
Airlines and airports do not create effective 
policies and standards. 
Airlines and airports create policies and standards 
that reduce security. 
Airlines and airports do not create policies and 
standards in a timely fashion. 
8 
Modify policies and standards 
based on security reports from the 
JPDO 
Airlines and airports stop creating policies and 
standards due to pressure. 
Insufficient funding is provided for security due to 
economic considerations. 
Funding for security is not provided. 
Security funding arrives late. 
9 Allocate resources for security 
Security funding is stopped before an attack. 
 
Table 9.  Inadequate Controls for Airlines and Airports. 
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Conversely, the JPDO provides feedback to the aforementioned companies through status 
and security reports.  The JPDO also imposes policies and standards on aircraft 
manufacturers as well as infrastructure companies and system integrators.  If security 
constraints are defined for the system in the development phase, they can be passed on to 
implementation and assurance organizations that provide feedback to the design group 
through test reports, review results, and threat assessments.  The JPDO’s roles and risks 
are provided in the table below. 
 
Item Responsibility Inadequate Control 
JPDO 
JPDO policies are not helpful to aerospace 
companies. 
JPDO policies reduce the security of products 
and services from aerospace companies. 
JPDO security policies are shared with 
aerospace companies after design decisions 
have been made. 
10 
Set policies for aircraft 
manufacturers and other 
aerospace companies 
JPDO stops providing security policies to 
aerospace companies. 
Threat assessments do not influence subsequent 
standards. 
Security standards do not mitigate threats 
because they are inappropriate. 
Security standards are not provided when they 
are needed. 
11 
Set security standards for the air 
transportation system design 
  
  
  
Security standards are no longer issued so 
security-related changes are not incorporated. 
 
Table 10.  Inadequate Controls for the JPDO. 
 
Those responsible for the maintenance and evolution of the system have the 
unique responsibility of bridging the development and operations activities.  The 
development organizations must share design rationale and threat assessments and in turn 
accept security change reports reflecting system evolution.  In parallel, the maintenance 
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and evolution organization must receive problem reports, change requests, and 
performance audits from the operating process, the air transportation system, in order to 
develop revised operating procedures, software revisions, and hardware replacements. 
Item Responsibility Inadequate Control 
Design & Documentation / Implementation & Assurance / Maintenance & Evolution 
Test reports, review results, and threat assessments 
do not influence constraints and standards. 
Test reports, review results, and threat assessments 
lead to incorrect constraints and standards. 
Test reports, review results, and threat assessments 
are not available in time to inform constraints and 
standards. 
15 Define security constraints as well as testing standards 
Test reports, review results, and threat assessments 
are no longer provided. 
Maintenance organization does not receive design 
rationale and security analyses necessary to 
securely evolve the system. 
Maintenance organization receives incorrect design 
rationale and security analysis. 
Maintenance organization receives design rationale 
and security analysis after maintenance activities 
have been completed. 
16 
Share threat assessments and 
design rationale with the 
Maintenance organization 
Maintenance organization stops receiving design 
rationale and security analysis during maintenance 
activities. 
Problem reports, change requests, and performance 
audits do not influence changes to procedures, 
software, or hardware. 
Problem reports, change requests, and performance 
audits are flawed or misinterpreted so they produce 
detrimental changes to procedures, software, or 
hardware. 
Problem reports, change requests, and performance 
audits are not provided in a timely fashion so they 
have less effect on procedures, software, or 
hardware. 
17 
Revise operating procedures and 
software as well as replace 
hardware 
Problems reports, change requests, and 
performance audits are not created or withheld from 
personnel responsible for revising operating 
procedures and software as well as replace 
hardware. 
Table 11.   Inadequate Controls for Development and Maintenance Organizations. 
 
Change requests, audit reports, and problem reports must also be sent to airport 
and airline operations organizations so that work instructions from these groups influence 
the system’s human controllers in the desired way.  Similar to the development phase, the 
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airports, airlines, and related companies define security policies as well as standards and 
allocate resources for the operations organizations.  Operations reports must be sent to the 
company management in order to influence policies, standards, and resources.  At the 
regulatory and industry association as well as legislative levels, the communication and  
control exhibited during system operations is very similar to system development. 
5.2.5  Aircraft Operations 
 
At this point in the analysis, now that the organizational risks have been 
elucidated, it is appropriate to consider the security implications of two major changes to 
operation of the aircraft themselves:  removal of human(s) and removal of voice 
communications as a standard communication medium.  There is no question that the 
removal of humans eliminates an entire class of security vulnerabilities.  Nevertheless, 
automation has not been shown to be inherently more secure.  When done improperly, 
automation can inject vulnerabilities.  Similarly, voice communications are often 
involved in security incidents.  However, any PC user that has gotten a virus or been 
involved in a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack knows that computer-to-
computer digital communication is often not secure.  Leveson explains the need for 
humans in automated systems in Safeware: 
Computers and other automated devices are best at trivial, straightforward tasks.  
An a priori response must be determined for every situation:  An algorithm 
provides predetermined rules and procedures to deal only with the set of 
conditions that have been foreseen.  Not all conditions are foreseeable, however, 
especially those that arise from a combination of events, and even those that can 
be predicted are programmed by error-prone humans…Human operators are 
included in complex systems because, unlike computers, they are adaptable and 
flexible…Humans can exercise judgment and are unsurpassed in recognizing 
patterns, making associative leaps, and operating in ill-structured, ambiguous 
situations (Leveson 1995). 
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Pilots, air traffic controllers, radio operators, and others involved in the operation 
of aircraft must be aware of four classes of inadequate control actions that could interfere 
with their primary responsibility of operating the system without security incidents. 
Item Responsibility Inadequate Control 
Aircraft and Ground Operators 
ATS operators make bad decisions because of poor 
assumptions and procedures. 
ATS operators choose to make decisions contrary to security 
objectives. 
ATS Operators does not make security decisions in a timely 
manner. 
18 
Operate the system 
without security 
incidents 
ATS Operators make decisions supporting security but do not 
follow through and therefore have insufficient impact. 
 
Table 12.  Inadequate Controls for ATS Operators. 
 
(Midkiff 2004) provides a detailed account of current aircraft operation procedures.  
Historically, these procedures have not been exploited to accomplish terrorist objectives.  
The reason for this is that attackers will almost always pursue the vulnerability that is 
most easily exploited.  In this case, the vulnerabilities associated with passenger and 
cargo screening were blatantly obvious and enabled (suicide) hijackers to board an 
aircraft and take control.  The current control structure for aircraft operations is shown 
below.  The essential communication and control between aircraft, ground assets, and 
satellites are highlighted.  As a representative example, threat six: 
A terrorist interferes with the aircraft communication, navigation, or surveillance 
systems. 
 
will be analyzed. 
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Figure 17.  Current Aircraft Operations Control Structure. 
 
During a flight, the airline communicates with an aircraft over a VHF radio.  In 
the event of an emergency, if the aircraft is out of communication range with the airline, 
the cockpit may attempt to communicate with other aircraft or ground assets over the 
emergency channel.  The second VHF radio is used to communicate with other aircraft in 
flight or air traffic control.  Weather and traffic data is passed along over this channel.  
Finally, a HF radio is also required to provide over-water communications with ATC. 
A variety of digital data links also exist to send data between aircraft and ground 
assets.  The Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) 
enables aircraft to transmit location (from GPS), altitude, and velocity information stored 
in the Flight Management System (FMS) computer to ATC over a satellite link.  
Similarly, ATC can send messages back to the FMS.  Vital communications during the 
final phases of flight include position data from the Instrument Landing Systems (ILS) 
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and automated audio recordings of non-control airport data (e.g. weather conditions) 
from the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS). 
 Not surprisingly, the captain and first officer also play a key role in the control 
structure.  Prior to takeoff, the captain coordinates activities with the ground crew while 
the first officer receives taxi out and take off information from ATC.  Once the aircraft is 
airborne, the captain controls the aircraft as the first officer provides visual traffic watch, 
inputs the radar heading and spacing, sets the mach target, and handles any other 
additional communications with ATC. 
With the drastic changes made to the ATS socio-technical control structure 
following 9/11, terrorists will likely be more inclined to instantiate threats in the 
operation of aircraft procedures.  A detailed list of changes to current air operations that 
may introduce vulnerabilities are provided in Appendix II.  Many of the changes in the 
control structure for NGATS are captured in the figure below. 
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Figure 18.  NGATS Aircraft/ATC Control Structure. 
 
Immediately, one notices the fact that the traffic watch and early phase communications 
fall to the Captain.  Additionally, a data network will be incorporated and used in place of 
voice communications (although voice communication equipment will still be onboard).  
The security requirements, control actions, and potential inadequate controls for the three 
principal components in this control structure are provided next. 
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Cockpit Crew (Captain and First Officer) 
Security Constraints: 
1. It must not be possible to disable TCAS from the cockpit.  TCAS shall be 
functioning before ATC authorizes takeoff. 
2. Pilots shall make setting the appropriate velocity a top priority. 
3. Pilots shall make resetting the altimeter a top priority. 
4. Pilots shall confirm over secure voice communications any suspicious 
ACARS data. 
5. Cockpits shall display ATIS data visually as well as audibly. 
6. Cockpits without crews (i.e. UAVs) shall have preprogrammed runways and 
landing information to be executed if communication with ATC is lost during 
descent, terminal area arrival, final approach, or landing.  
 
Control Actions:   
1. Regulation – Design:  All new aircraft shall be designed to satisfy this security 
requirement.  If the collision avoidance system is disabled, it is much easier 
for a terrorist to orchestrate a collision. 
2. Regulation – Training and Standard Procedures:  Operating procedures, flight 
simulators, and mandatory training shall equip pilots to set the appropriate 
velocity despite interruptions and distractions at different times.  If the correct 
velocity is not set, it is much easier for a terrorist to orchestrate a collision. 
3. Regulation – Training and Standard Procedures:  Operating procedures, flight 
simulators, and mandatory training shall equip pilots to reset the altimeter 
despite interruptions and distractions at different times.  If the correct altitude 
is not set, it is much easier for a terrorist to orchestrate a collision. 
4. Regulation – Training and Standard Procedures:  Operating procedures, flight 
simulators, and mandatory training shall equip pilots to verify suspicious 
ACARS data over voice communications. 
5. Regulation – Design:  Human factors experts will be responsible for ATIS 
subsystem design.  If a terrorist distracts a pilot in the later phases of flight 
and he misses important ATIS information, a text-based version of the report 
will allow him to quickly get the necessary data. 
6. Regulation – Design:  All UAVs certified for operations in the NGATS shall 
be designed to satisfy the preprogrammed runway requirement.  In the event 
that communication between ATC and a UAV is jammed, the UAV must still 
successfully land.  One way to do this is to preprogram before takeoff an 
assigned runway as well as other details necessary for the UAV to reach its 
destination airport if communication is lost. 
 
Potential Inadequate Controls:   
1. TCAS 
a. Design regulations do not prohibit TCAS deactivation in the cockpit. 
b. Design regulations require TCAS deactivation in the cockpit. 
c. Design regulations prohibiting TCAS deactivation go into effect after 
NGATS certified aircraft are built. 
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d. Design regulations prohibiting TCAS deactivation are suspended 
during NGATS operations. 
2. Setting Velocity 
a. Procedures and training are insufficient to direct pilots to ensure that 
the correct velocity is set after they are interrupted. 
b. Procedures and training form pilots that are careless about setting the 
target velocity. 
c. Good procedures and training for setting the velocity target are 
developed too late. 
d. Procedures and training for setting the velocity target are withdrawn. 
3. Resetting Altimeter 
a. Procedures and training are insufficient to direct pilots to ensure that 
the altimeter is reset at the proper time after they are interrupted. 
b. Procedures and training form pilots that are careless about resetting the 
altimeter. 
c. Good procedures and training for resetting the altimeter are developed 
too late. 
d. Procedures and training for resetting the altimeter are withdrawn. 
4. ACARS Data 
a. Procedures and training are insufficient to direct pilots to ensure that 
suspicious ACARS data is verified with voice communications. 
b. Procedures and training form pilots that do not verify suspicious 
ACARS data over voice communications. 
c. Good procedures and training for verifying suspicious ACARS data 
over voice communications are developed too late. 
d. Procedures and training for verifying suspicious ACARS data are 
withdrawn. 
5. ATIS Subsystem 
a. Design specifications do not require visual presentation of ATIS 
information. 
b. Design specifications do not allow visual presentation of ATIS 
information. 
c. Design specifications that mandate visual and audible presentation of 
ATIS information are created too late. 
d. Design specifications that mandate visual and audible presentation of 
ATIS information are withdrawn. 
6. UAVs 
a. Design specifications do not require preprogrammed landing routines. 
b. Design specifications do not allow preprogrammed landing routines. 
c. Design specifications that mandate preprogrammed landing routines 
are created too late. 
d. Design specifications that mandate preprogrammed landing routines 
are withdrawn. 
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 Air Traffic Control 
Security Constraints:   
1. A terrorist must not be able to remotely take control of an aircraft on the 
ground. 
2. A terrorist must not be able to remotely take control of an airborne aircraft. 
3. All UAVs shall be equipped with override technology to permit the FAA to 
take over control if suspicious behavior is observed. 
 
Control Action:   
1. Regulation – Design & Training and Standard Procedures:  When the landing 
gear of a piloted aircraft is deployed, automated aircraft coordination 
technology (e.g. externally commanded separation distances) must be 
disabled.  There is no reason for pilots not to have control during this period.  
Aircraft technology as well as pilot training must implement this control. 
2. Regulation – Design:  In order to optimize the queuing of airborne aircraft, 
NGATS plans to implement technologies to enable optimization of aircraft 
throughput.  It is envisioned that aircraft in a flock would automatically 
coordinate altitude, separation distance, and velocity.  Aircraft technology 
must permit pilots to override external controls and automatically inform other 
aircraft in the flock that the aircraft is breaking formation.  This control 
prevents a terrorist from creating conditions with inadequate separation 
distance, dangerously low altitude, or dangerously high velocity for example. 
 
Additionally, in order to securely transition to reduced aircraft separation 
distances, more precise navigational aids are required.  The current 
infrastructure associated with the terrestrial radio navigation is highly 
vulnerable.  VHF Omni-directional Radio Range (VOR), Non-directional 
Beacons (NDB), and Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) are often located 
at remote positions at an airport and protected only by a chain-link fence or 
locked door.  According to (Blakey 2006): 
The current system of radio navigation aids is a large complex network 
of transmitters that require extensive resources to operate and maintain.  
The new global threat of terrorism also poses a threat to these systems.  
Security for these facilities is minimal.  A coordinated effort to take a 
number of the transmitters off-line could cause disruptions throughout 
the air travel system.  Satellite and airborne surveillance systems provide 
a more secure system and increased operational safety…With most of 
the money spent on aviation security directed toward the passenger, little 
focus has been spent on the radio navigation ground stations. 
 
The Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) system is the 
solution to this problem.  ADS-B receives positions information from the GPS 
network and combines it with an aircraft’s altitude and velocity vector.  This 
state variable is then broadcast to other aircraft and ground assets.  It 
essentially provides the same information as TCAS but it does not coordinate 
maneuvers so cannot be considered a collision avoidance system.  Finally, 
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GPS is a much more secure system compared to terrestrial radio navigation.  
There are only five ground monitoring sites world-wide and even if they were 
all disabled, GPS could function for six months autonomously.  Additionally, 
the US reliance on GPS for military operations makes the system well 
protected.  Local jamming attempts have often proven ineffective due to error 
correction and signal integrity codes (Blakey 2006).  See Appendix III for a 
possible deployment schedule. 
3. Regulation – Design:  It is possible that a terrorist may program a UAV to 
behave as a guided missile.  In order to mitigate this threat, it must be possible 
for the FAA to securely access an in-flight UAV and redirect it to an airport or 
remote location if the UAV deviates from its flight plan and heads to a 
potential target.  For example, if a UAV is supposed to carry cargo from 
Boston to New York but continues on past New York toward Washington DC, 
it must be stopped.  Before takeoff, an FAA authority should provide the 
UAV with symmetric cryptographic keys valid only for the particular flight so 
that no one else may remotely access it afterwards. 
 
Potential Inadequate Controls:   
1. Ground Aircraft 
a. Approved aircraft designs do not disable remote control before takeoff 
and after landing. 
b. Approved aircraft designs make it impossible to disable remote control 
before takeoff and after landing. 
c. Aircraft designs that disable remote control before takeoff and after 
landing are approved after the system has been fielded. 
d. External pressure forces the regulation that mandates disabled remote 
control before takeoff and after landing to be withdrawn. 
2. Airborne Aircraft 
a. Pilots are not able to override external controls. 
b. External controls are designed to override pilot actions. 
c. It takes long time for pilots to override external controls. 
d. Pilot actions can be interrupted by external controls. 
3. UAVs 
a. UAVs are created that the FAA cannot control in an emergency 
b. UAVs are designed to override external FAA control. 
c. It takes an excessive amount of time for the FAA to take control of a 
UAV. 
d. FAA control of a threatening UAV can be disrupted. 
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Data Network 
Security Constraints:   
1. A terrorist must not be permitted to send data to aircraft during gate 
departure/taxi out/take off. 
2. The signal carrying the Mach target shall be jam resistant. 
3. A terrorist must not be able to communicate with airborne aircraft and impact 
flight operations. 
4. All data transmitted over ACARS shall contain sender identity. 
5. A terrorist shall not be able to send ATIS data that appears valid to a pilot. 
6. A terrorist must not be able to send incorrect data during landing and rollout. 
 
Control Action:   
1. Regulation – Design:  Communication between the cockpit, ground crews, 
and ground control, must be strongly secured.  Given that such features as 
remote control of aircraft will be implemented over this network, firewalls and 
intrusion detection mechanisms are necessary, but not sufficient technologies.  
Attacks can develop from passengers within an aircraft as well as from 
external attackers over the satellite connection.  Flooding and eavesdropping 
are particularly relevant issues in satellite networks due to their broadcast 
nature. 
  
Most researchers agree that an IP based scheme for the air to ground link is 
the best approach.  IPSec is a solution that operates at the network layer.  This 
guarantees compatibility with a variety of applications that use different 
schemes at the application and transport levels.  The Authentication Header 
provides data authentication, the Encapsulating Security Protocol provides an 
encryption algorithm, and the Key Exchange Protocol defines how keys are 
shared.  Additionally, IPSec can operate in two different modes.  The payload 
of the packet is encrypted in Transport mode, while in Tunnel Mode the entire 
packet is encrypted and the IP header of the tunnel end point is appended.  For 
more details see Appendix IV. 
2.  Regulation – Design:  If the correct velocity is not set, it is much easier for a 
terrorist to orchestrate a collision.  Therefore, electronic protection of the 
Mach target signal must be employed.  The primary electronic protection 
technique relevant to aircraft operations is spread spectrum communications.  
Particular instantiations of spread spectrum technology include frequency 
hopping, direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS), and burst transmission.  
Frequency-hopping devices jump from one frequency to another according to 
a pseudorandom sequence known only to trusted parties.  Two metrics gauge 
its effectiveness, process gain and jamming margin.  
Process gain is:  
lBandwidthInputSigna
widthSignalBand  
 
For example, a 1 Mbit/sec signal spread over 100Mhz has a process gain of 
100 dB.   
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Jamming margin is:  
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
Noise
EnergyMininumBit
ocessGainPr  
or more colloquially the “maximum tolerable ratio of jamming power to 
signal power.”  (Anderson 2001)  Unfortunately, an attacker only needs to 
execute partial band jamming that creates enough errors that the signal is 
unreadable. 
 
DSSS relies on similar principles compared to frequency hopping.  The 
original narrow band signal is over-sampled and XORed with a wide band 
pseudonoise signal defined by a stream cipher.  The receiver must XOR the 
same pseudonoise signal to recapture the demodulated signal from which the 
original signal can be extracted. DSSS provides the same theoretical jamming 
margin as frequency hopping but usually operates in a low power mode that 
makes it difficult for an enemy to detect the signal from the background noise. 
  
Burst communications is achieved by compressing data and transmitting it in 
bursts at times defined by a similar pseudorandom sequence.  This technique 
is not particularly jam resistant but offers the advantage of making the signal 
difficult to detect in the first place.  “Modern military systems will use some 
combination of tight beams, DSSS, hopping, and burst” (Anderson 2001) and 
NGATS communication should as well.  See Appendix V for more details. 
3.   Regulation – Design:  An IPSec scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography 
describe in the first control action is also suitable for securing the ATN during 
the climb and cruise stages.  In order to address particular details related to 
inter-aircraft communication and aircraft-ATC communication, Appendix VI 
provides more design details. 
4.  Regulation – Design & Training and Standard Procedures:  Incorrect location, 
velocity, and altitude information can assist a terrorist in creating a collision.  
If the identity of sources transmitting ACARS data to the Flight Management 
System (FMS) computer cannot be verified, pilots should not act on them.  
Using the techniques discussed in Appendix VI, a sender ID should be bound 
to all messages.  Additionally, pilot training must instill an instinct to distrust 
ACARS messages from unknown sources.   
5.  Regulation – Design:  False weather reports may lead pilots to take the wrong 
action during the final phases of flight.  Automated audio recordings of non-
control airport data must be secured in a similar way as ACARS data.   
6.  Regulation – Design:  The solutions in control actions 1 and 3 and their 
corresponding appendices effectively implements security requirement 6. 
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Potential Inadequate Controls:   
1. Terrorists Compromise Communications during Gate departure/Taxi out/Take 
off 
a. Security protocols are not properly implemented and operators are not 
trained to use them correctly. 
b. Communications during Gate departure/Taxi out/Take off are not 
secured. 
c. It is possible to disable secure communications and terrorists exploit 
data transmitted over an open channel. 
d. Aircraft and ground crews/control begin communicating in a secure 
way but cease to do so at some point during gate departure, taxi out, or 
take off. 
2. Mach Target Signal 
a. The Mach target signal is not designed to be jam resistant. 
b. The Mach target signal is designed to be easily jammed. 
c. Tight beams, DSSS, frequency hopping, and burst communications are 
used only after the Mach target has been set. 
d. Tight beams, DSSS, frequency hopping, and burst communications are 
used in the early phases of flight but disabled shortly before the cruise 
phase. 
3. Terrorists Compromise Communications during Climb/Cruise 
a. Security protocols are not properly implemented and operators are not 
trained to use them correctly. 
b. Communications during Climb/Cruise are not secured. 
c. It is possible to disable secure communications and terrorists exploit 
data transmitted over an open channel. 
d. Aircraft and ATC begin communicating in a secure way but cease to 
do so at some point during the climb or cruise phases. 
4. ACARS Transmissions 
a. ACARS data is sent without verifiable sender information. 
b. ACARS data is sent with false or unverifiable sender information. 
c. System operators start checking for verifiable sender information after 
they have received or acted on unverified data. 
d. System operators stop checking for verifiable sender information. 
5. ATIS Transmissions 
a. Anyone can transmit what appears to be valid ATIS data. 
b. Terrorists change ATIS information transmitted by an airport. 
c. Terrorists send incorrect ATIS information for short time and pilots act 
on it. 
d. Terrorists send incorrect ATIS information after correct information 
was transmitted and pilots act on the new data. 
6. Terrorists Compromise Communications during Landing and Rollout 
a. Security protocols are not properly implemented and operators are not 
trained to use them correctly. 
b. Communications during landing and rollout are not secured. 
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c. It is possible to disable secure communications and terrorists exploit 
data transmitted over an open channel. 
d. Aircraft and ATC begin communicating in a secure way but cease to 
do so at some point during the landing or rollout. 
 
5.2.6  System Dynamics Modeling 
The final step of a STAMP-based analysis is System Dynamics (SD) modeling.  
System Dynamics is used to understand how the static control structure designed in the 
earlier stages and the attackers themselves could evolve.  In particular, one is interested 
in evolution to insecure states such that security constraints would no longer be enforced 
by components in the socio-technical system.  Unlike system safety engineering in which 
many risks and hazards are “generated” endogenously within the socio-technical system, 
security engineering risks and threats often develop exogenously.  While the “insider-
threat” must be addressed, malicious actors outside of the ATS must be modeled.  
Terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, are an example of an exogenous factor.  To illustrate 
the SD modeling approach in this thesis, a causal loop diagram model of terrorism and 
the outside factors that influence it was developed and analyzed. 
 
Figure 19.  Relationship of Terrorism and ATS Models. 
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System Dynamics was created at MIT in the 1950s by Jay Forrester. Its 
theoretical basis comes from control systems and non-linear dynamics. Complex systems, 
whether they are technical, organizational, or some combination, often exhibit highly 
non-linear behavior where the relationship between cause and effect is not intuitively 
obvious.  According to (Martinez-Moyano 2005): 
System Dynamics is a computer-aided approach to policy analysis and design 
that applies to dynamic problems arising in complex social, managerial, 
economic, or ecological systems.  Dynamic systems are characterized by 
interdependence, mutual interaction, information feedback, and circular 
causality. 
 
System Dynamics models are constructed by a combination or positive (reinforcing) and 
negative (balancing) feedback loops in addition to state and rate variables (Sterman 
2000).  
 
Figure 20.  Reinforcing and Balancing Loops. 
Image Source (Dulac 2007c) 
 
At its lowest level, a SD model is a system of coupled, first order, non-linear 
ordinary differential equations presented in an easy to understand graphical form 
accessible to policy makers. The models can be simulated to obtain numerical results.  In 
order to show the connection between traditional mathematics and SD visualizations, the 
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figure below presents the graphical representation of a differential equation.  While this 
level of understanding is not necessary for policy makers and managers to benefit from 
causal loop diagrams, the diagram is shown to assist scientists and engineers learning 
System Dynamics (Laracy 2007b).  The state variable, X, is controlled by two rate 
variables, Y and Z.  Three auxiliary variables also are also provided, A, B, and T, that 
define Y and Z and each other.  Ultimately, this SD model integrates the differential 
equation, shown over the state variable, X. 
 
Figure 21.  A Differential Equation Implemented as a System Dynamics Model. 
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The following quote by John Sterman, a leading scholar in the field, 
communicates the philosophy of System Dynamics (Sterman 2002): 
While it’s hard to define what system dynamics is, I don’t have any trouble 
answering why it is valuable. As the world changes ever faster, thoughtful 
leaders increasingly recognize that we are not only failing to solve the persistent 
problems we face, but are in fact causing them. All too often, well-intentioned 
efforts to solve pressing problems create unanticipated “side effects.”  Our 
decisions provoke reactions we did not foresee. Today’s solutions become 
tomorrow’s problems. The result is policy resistance, the tendency for 
interventions to be defeated by the response of the system to the intervention 
itself. From California’s failed electricity reforms, to road building programs that 
create suburban sprawl and actually increase traffic congestion, to pathogens that 
evolve resistance to antibiotics, our best efforts to solve problems often make 
them worse.  At the root of this phenomenon lies the narrow, event-oriented, 
reductionist worldview most people live by. We have been trained to see the 
world as a series of events, to view our situation as the result of forces outside 
ourselves, forces largely unpredictable and uncontrollable…System dynamics 
helps us expand the boundaries of our mental models so that we become aware of 
and take responsibility for the feedbacks created by our decisions. –John Sterman  
 
The “well-intentioned efforts to solve pressing problems create unanticipated ‘side 
effects’” mentioned above will be explored in the thesis’ terrorism model. 
It is helpful to consider SD models at various levels of abstraction.  Dulac and 
Owens (Dulac 2007b) have defined a five layer hierarchy of abstraction.  At the highest 
level of a model are the major loops.  These are captured in what is usually referred to as 
a causal loop diagram.  Large models may be broken into components, or modules, to 
achieve intellectual manageability goals.  Within these modules, state, rate, and auxiliary 
variables are defined.  Like any modeling activity, these variables carry a number of 
assumptions that are made explicit with data and equations. 
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Figure 22.  Owens-Dulac Abstraction Model for System Dynamics. 
Image Source (Dulac 2007c) 
 
5.2.6.1  A Model of Terrorism 
Initially, simple causal loop diagrams are developed that elucidate the non-linear 
cause-effect relationship.  These qualitative models suggest policies that acknowledge 
feedback in the system and can prevent delayed unintended consequences.  Causal loop 
diagrams, and more generally system archetypes (Senge 2006), anchor the development 
of high fidelity, quantitative models that allow the use of simulation to explore scenarios 
and rigorously investigate dynamic hypotheses (Gonzalez 2005).  The causal loop 
diagram below corresponds to Level 1 in the Owens-Dulac hierarchy.  It was developed 
by the author in a modeling activity with John Sterman and Kim Thompson. 
 
Level 5: Data and Equations
Level 4: Assumptions and Conventions
Level 2: Model Modules
Level 1:         
Major Loops 
Level 3: Variables and Minor 
Loops 
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Figure 23.  Causal Loop Diagram of Terrorism. 
 
The model contains the major feedback loops that govern the behavior of terrorists, such 
as those that would attack the Air Transportation System.  In order to accomplish the goal 
of minimizing the Attractiveness of Terrorism, one must examine the reinforcing and 
balancing loops that influence terrorist behavior. 
Retaliation Works (Balancing Loop) 
 The first balancing loop is called Retaliation Works.  In this loop, one sees that as 
the Attractiveness of Terrorism increases, Terrorist Attacks increase, Fear in Target 
Nation increases, and so does Retaliation.  The net effect of this is that Attractiveness of 
Terrorism decreases.  This result was certainly not intended by the terrorists involved, but 
nonetheless has shown to be true in some instances (e.g. Barbary Pirates in 1815 and the 
Taliban Government in 2001). 
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Greater Isolation (Reinforcing Loop) 
 However, an increase in retaliation also has the potential to reinforce the 
Attractiveness of Terrorism.  Retaliation has the effect of reducing the Conventional 
Military and Political Power of Terrorist States, thereby increasing the attractiveness of 
asymmetric warfare, such as the attack on 9/11.  Part of this causal loop also has the 
potential, with a delay, to increase the Ideological Acceptability of Terrorism, thus 
increasing the Attractiveness of Terrorism.   
Sanctions Work (Balancing Loop) 
 Instead of retaliation, Sanctions are another option to be explored to mitigate the 
threat of terrorism.  An increase in the Attractiveness of Terrorism will lead to an 
increase in the Fear in Target Nation, an increase in Sanctions, and finally a decrease in 
the Attractiveness of Terrorism. 
Deepening Hatred (Reinforcing Loop) 
However, Sanctions can also lead to deepening hatred.  Sanctions may fuel 
Terrorist Grievances and therefore increase the Attractiveness of Terrorism.  In the later 
half of the twentieth century, economic sanctions against Middle Eastern states that 
support terror have been a cause for terrorists to incite populations against the United 
States. 
Getting What They Want (Balancing Loop) 
 Another loop can create the situation where the increase in Terrorist Attacks leads 
to an increase in Fear in Target Nation that leads to an increase in 
Negotiations/Concessions.  Negotiations/Concessions reduce Terrorist Grievances and 
finally reduce the Attractiveness of Terrorism.  The terrorist attack in Spain on March 11, 
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2004 days before the national election led to the selection of a government sympathetic to 
the causes of Jihadists and the cessation of terrorist attacks in that country. 
5.2.6.2  Impacts of System Dynamics 
New strategies must be developed to prevent an attack as well as manage the 
aftermath. Informal, ad hoc approaches will almost certainly fall short of accomplishing 
the desired goal of little to no casualties (Laracy 2006).  A rigorous, systematic method is 
necessary to develop an appropriate approach. Traditional mathematical modeling has 
made significant contributions to this end. However, according to John Sterman, “The 
greatest potential for improvement comes when the modeling process changes deeply 
held mental models.” (Sterman 2000)  The author proposes an approach that brings the 
power of control theory in an accessible way to security professionals and policy makers 
involved in the Air Transportation System.  In consultation with air transportation 
security experts, future work in this area would involve defining the references modes for 
the key variables described above and instantiating a simulation model.   
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CHAPTER 6:  Conclusion 
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6.1  Results 
In Chapter Three, the question was asked: 
Can a security model be developed that does not rely on the assumptions of 
quantitative risk assessment, considers issues at a level closer to system design 
and operation compared to game theory, and supports successful red teaming? 
 
The STAMP based analysis presented in this thesis offers an approach that 
answers in the affirmative.  STAMP-Sec addresses many of the pitfalls associated 
with applying quantitative risk assessment and game theory to security problems.  
Additionally, it implicitly supports the use of red teaming to test that the socio-
technical system has not evolved in such a way that security constraints are no 
longer enforced. 
 Unlike probabilistic risk assessment approaches (Apostolakis 2004), 
STAMP-Sec appropriately addresses the role of software, human factors, security 
culture, and design errors in the development of engineering systems.  In fact, it 
explicitly addresses how to incorporate these key factors into the security 
requirements (i.e. constraints) of the Air Transportation System.  The inherent 
flaws in the use of subjective probability (i.e. expert guessing) identified by 
(Tversky 1974) are completely avoided.  No assumptions are made as to the 
adherence of system users and attackers to the axioms of rationality (Savage 
1954).  Perhaps most importantly, the engagement between the attacker and the 
defender of the system has not been excessively simplified (e.g. abstracting the 
engagement to a two-stage Markov process) to facilitate modeling.  Finally, the 
intelligence of the adversary is appreciated unlike reliability-based approaches 
that apply the 80/20 rule (Bier 2005). 
 Page 109 of 133 
Similarly, the STAMP approach does not share the inherent weaknesses of 
game-theoretic security modeling.  Game theory models of security often make 
simplifying assumptions such as the attacker can only execute one attack at a 
time.  STAMP-Sec does not engage in these types of assumptions.  The fact that 
defenders and attackers may value targets differently is not relevant and no 
mathematical assumptions are made such as the fact that the probability of an 
attack is a convex function of the defensive resource spending.  If a STAMP-
based executable simulation is developed, sensitivity analysis of System 
Dynamics models eliminates the uncertainty that initially exists with quantitative 
model parameters.  Lastly, unlike game theory’s emphasis on strategy, STAMP-
Sec informs both the design and tactical operation of complex engineering 
systems. 
STAMP-Sec provides concrete information that can be directly incorporated into 
requirements and design documents.  Furthermore, it provides recommendations for how 
to address these security issues through the definition of constraints, responsible 
components, and control actions.  Finally, the possible inadequate controls and causes for 
constraint violation are explored. 
 Informational, operational, and physical security issues are addressed holistically.  
Notably, many of the security issues identified in this thesis are not associated with the 
failure of any device or subsystem.  Rather, threats emerge from inadequate control.  By 
showing where communication and feedback could be lost in the transition from the 
current ATS to NGATS, many risks are identified.  Additionally, given the use of 
increased automation in NGATS, STAMP-Sec is particularly applicable because it 
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acknowledges the role that software plays in security incidents.  In conclusion, the 
aforementioned strengths, sustained by the valuable results obtained for the Next 
Generation Air Transportation System, support the hypothesis that STAMP provides 
insight into security problems and motivates future research to further categorize its 
strengths and weaknesses. 
6.2  Future Work 
The results from this thesis motivate a variety of future work in the field of 
system security.  With regard to the Next Generation Air Transportation, the analysis 
provides a good starting point for the JPDO to pursue a STAMP-based approach to 
achieving security goals.  Given its applicability to the ATS, it would also be worthwhile 
to apply the methodology to other infrastructure systems such as damns, tunnels and 
bridges, and oil- natural gas rigs.  Finally, this research inspires continued work showing 
the interconnection of technology, organizations, and human behavior in security. 
 
 
 
“What’s the difference between a highly secure computer and a brick?   
It’s cheaper to use a brick to hold a door open.” 
- David Clark 
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And you will know the Truth, and the Truth 
will set you free. 
 
John 8:32 
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APPENDIX I – 9/11 Timeline 
1988:  Al Qaeda was formed. 
1992:  Al Qaeda attacked Yemeni hotel housing US military personnel. 
1993:  Al Qaeda shot down US helicopters in Somalia. 
1995:  Al Qaeda bombed US troops training the Saudi National Guard in Riyadh. 
July, 1995:  A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) predicted terrorist attacks in the US.  
It warned that the danger was increasing and that the “White House, the Capitol, symbols 
of capitalism such as Wall Street, critical infrastructures such as power grids, areas where 
people congregate such as sports arenas, and civil aviation” were particularly vulnerable. 
1996:  The “Gore” Commission on Aviation Security that was formed to identify 
deficiencies in Aviation Security did not identify suicide hijackings as a possibility. 
1997:  A NIE stated that “Iran and its surrogates, as well as terrorist financier Usama Bin 
Ladin and his followers, have stepped up their threats and surveillance of US facilities 
abroad in what also may be a portent of possible additional attacks in the United States.” 
June, 1998:  Intelligence briefing entitled “Bin Ladin Threatening to Attack US 
Aircraft.” 
August, 1998:  Intelligence reports indicate interest by Libyan terrorists to crash a plane 
into the World Trade Center.  Also, hundreds are killed by Al Qaeda terrorists in the 
bombings of US embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi.  President Clinton 
ordered a missile attack against terrorist targets in Afghanistan. 
December 4, 1998:  DCI Tenet issued a directive to CIA officials on the importance of 
counter-terrorism operations stating:  “We are at war.  I want no resources or people 
spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the Community.” 
January, 1999:  Intelligence briefing entitled “Strains Surface Between Taliban and Bin 
Ladin”. 
April, 1999:  The New York Times ran an article entitled “US Hard Put to Find Proof Bin 
Laden Directed Attacks” that attempted to debunk claims that Bin Ladin was a terrorist 
leader. 
June, 1999:  Intelligence briefing entitled “Terrorist Threats to US Interests in 
Caucasus.” 
December, 1999:  Intelligence briefing entitled “Bin Ladin to Exploit Looser Security 
During Holidays.” 
August, 1999:  The FAA Civil Aviation Security Intelligence Office report judged a 
“suicide hijacking operation” to be unlikely because “it does not offer an opportunity for 
dialogue to achieve the key goal of obtaining Rahman and other key captive extremists.” 
December 12, 1999:  Jordanian authorities arrested 16 members of Al Qaeda plotting to 
bomb a hotel in Jordan, a site along the Israel/Jordan border, and 2 Christian holy sites. 
December 14, 1999:  Ahmed Ressam, a member of Al Qaeda, was arrested at the 
US/Canada border for plotting to bomb Los Angeles International Airport. 
March, 2000:  Intelligence briefing entitled “Bin Ladin Evading Sanctions.” 
October 12, 2000:  USS Cole attacked by Al Qaeda agents. 
January/Feburary, 2001:  DCI Tenet and Deputy Director for Operations Pavitt brief 
President Bush, VP Cheney, and NSA Rice on the threat of Al Qaeda.  Bush asked 
whether killing Osama Bin Ladin would solve the problem.  Tenet and Pavitt answered 
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that it would reduce the threat, but to completely remove it required disrupting Al 
Qaeda’s ability to use Afghanistan as a sanctuary. 
February, 2001:  Intelligence briefing entitled “Bin Ladin’s Interest in Biological, 
Radiological Weapons.” 
March:  Terrorist advisory issued for a heightened threat of Sunni extremists against US 
facilities, personnel, and interests.  Additionally, due to the fact that the CIA 
Counterterrorist Center (CTC) staff was overwhelmed just doing collection duties, DCI 
Tenet created a strategic assessments branch with a senior manager reporting to him and 
10 new analysts. 
April 13:  The FBI directed field offices to query human sources and databases for 
information pertaining to “current operational activities relating to Sunni extremism.”  
There was no mention of a domestic threat. 
May:  An intelligence report stated that “Bin Ladin network’s plans advancing.”  A FBI 
walk-in suggested attacks were planned against London, Boston, and New York.  A US 
embassy received a phone call indicating that Bin Ladin planed to attack the US with 
“high explosives.”  The FAA issued a notice to airlines about the potential for “an airline 
hijacking to free terrorists incarcerated in the United States.” 
May 17:  US Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) #1 agenda item was “UBL:  
Operation Planned in US.” 
May 29:  The head of the CSG, Richard Clarke, asked NSA Rice to ask DCI Tenet what 
the US could do to prevent Abu Zubaydah from launching “a series of major terrorist 
attacks.”  He further stated that “when these attacks occur, as they likely will, we will 
wonder what more we could have done to stop them.” 
June 12:  CIA reported that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was recruiting terrorists for Bin 
Ladin to travel to the US to meet operatives there. 
June 21:  US Central Command raised force protection level to Delta (highest level). 
June 22:  CIA notified all station chiefs that al Qaeda was planning suicide attacks 
against US targets over the next few days. 
June 25:  Clarke warned Rice and her deputy, Hadley, that “A series of new reports 
continue to convince me and analysts at State, CIA, DIA, and NSA that a major terrorist 
attack or series of attacks is likely in July.”  An al Qaeda intelligence report warned that 
something “very, very, very, very” big was about to happen. 
June:  Terrorist advisories issued in late June were entitled “Bin Ladin Attacks May be 
Imminent” and “Bin Ladin and Associates Making Near-Term Threats.” 
July 2:  FBI Counterterrorism Division notified federal agencies as well as state and local 
officials that “The FBI has no information indicating a credible threat of terrorist attack in 
the United States.”  Meanwhile, overseas, al Qaeda disruptions activities were occurring 
in 20 countries. 
July 5:  Clarke arranged for the CIA to brief the INS, FAA, Coast Guard, Secret Service, 
Customs Department, and FBI on the al Qaeda threat. 
July 9:  Clarke met with 27 agencies including the groups present on July 5 on the 
“current threat level.” 
July:  In mid-July, reports indicated that al Qaeda’s plans were delayed two months.  
Additionally, an FBI agent in Phoenix sent a memo to FBI HQ and NY identifying the 
“possibility of a coordinated effort by Usama Bin Ladin” to send terrorists to US flight 
schools.  The agent felt that there was an “inordinate number of individuals of 
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investigative interest” studying aviation in Arizona.  He recommended compiling a list of 
aviation schools, establishing a liaison with the schools, discussing the matter with the 
Intelligence community, and seeking authority to obtain visa information on the students. 
July 27:  Clarke informed Rice and Hadley that a “spike in intelligence about a near-term 
al Qaeda attack had stopped.” 
July 31:  An FAA notice stated that “reports of possible near-term terrorist 
operations…particularly on the Arabian Peninsula and/or Israel.”  Tenet stated that his 
world was “blinking red” and that it could not “get any worse.” 
August 1:  FBI issued an advisory that increased attention should be paid to security 
planning. 
August 3:  Intelligence advisory indicated that “al Qaeda was lying in wait and searching 
for gaps in security before moving forward with the planned attacks.” 
August 6:  In response to questioning by President Bush starting in the spring about 
whether there was a domestic threat, a PDB on this day was entitled “Bin Ladin 
Determined to Strike in US.”  At this time, the FBI had 70 on-going investigations into 
Bin Ladin. 
August 17:  INS arrested Zacarias Moussaoui on immigration violations and a 
deportation order was issued.  FBI HQ felt that FBI agents in Minneapolis were trying to 
get people “spun up.”  The supervisor in Minneapolis stated that he was “trying to keep 
someone from taking a plane and crashing into the World Trade Center.”  FBI HQ 
thought this was very unlikely and wasn’t sure if Moussaoui was a terrorist. 
August 23:  DCI Tenet read a brief entitled “Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly” and learns 
about Moussaoui.  “Tenet was told that Moussaoui wanted to learn to fly a 747, paid for 
his training in cash, was interested to learn the doors do not open in flight, and wanted to 
fly a simulated flight from London to New York.” 
September 4:  In response to DoD and CIA foot-dragging, Clarke wrote a memo to Rice 
asking “are we serious about dealing with the al Qida threat?” 
September 10:  The first senior manager of the CIA Counterterrorist Center (CTC) 
reports for duty. 
September 11:  Three planes are taken over by suicide hijackers from Al Qaeda. 
 
Source:  Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Official 
Government Edition. 
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APPENDIX II – NGATS Vulnerabilities 
Gate Departure/Taxi Out/Take Off 
Activity Vulnerabilities 
1.  When the aircraft is ready for 
departure, the Captain talks with the tug 
driver or ground crewmember over the 
interphone while the First Officer 
communicates with ATC or ramp control 
over the VHF radio. 
A. Standard operating procedure 
(SOP) (JPDO 2004) does not involve 
human communication and 
coordination of cockpit with tug 
driver, ground crew, ATC, or ramp 
control. 
B. Captain must coordinate 
departure with both the ground crew 
and ATC. 
2.  During initial climb-out, a crew 
member must perform “traffic watch” in 
addition to monitoring TCAS. 
C. TCAS is practically the only 
traffic advisory system because a 
Captain cannot perform visual “traffic 
watch.”  
3.  During terminal area departure, ATC 
provides radar heading assignments to 
provide for adequate spacing and 
minimize ground track. 
D. Separation distance is too close 
for a human to safely operate the 
aircraft. 
4.  During the climb, the crew compares 
the optimal and maximum cruise altitudes 
as well as the desired velocity by 
reviewing the FMS and/or performance 
charts.  The optimal cruise altitude is 
defined by sharing this information with 
ATC. 
E. The Captain will be required to 
compare the optimal and maximum 
cruise altitudes as well as the desired 
velocity by reviewing the FMS and/or 
performance charts without assistance. 
F. SOP does not involve human 
communication and coordination of 
cockpit with ATC. 
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Climb/Cruise 
 
Activity Vulnerabilities 
5.  After the aircraft passes 18,000 feet 
MSL, the altimeter is reset by the crew 
from a local barometric pressure setting to 
the standard atmosphere pressure 
reference.  It is important that all aircraft 
at high altitudes use the same pressure 
reference. 
G. The Captain must reset the 
altimeter in addition to the traditional 
duties. 
 
6.  At cruise altitudes, 2000 ft vertical 
separation is required. 1000 ft is permitted 
if the aircraft meets requirements for 
reduced vertical separation minimums. 
H. Separation distance is too close 
for a human to safely operate the 
aircraft in flight. 
 
7.  When the aircraft approaches cruise 
altitude, the Mach target is set and 
reported to ATC. 
I. SOP does not involve human 
communication and coordination of 
cockpit with ATC. 
8.  Aircraft should have 2 VHF 
transceivers and 1 HF radio if overwater 
certified.  1VHF radio is set to ATC and 
the other is set to a company channel or 
the universal emergency channel.  
SATCOM is a superior technology over 
HF when available.  When out of ATC 
contact, the aircraft switches VHF 
frequencies to the air-to-air channel to get 
ride reports and en-route weather reports 
from other aircraft. 
J. SOP does not involve human 
communication and coordination of 
cockpit with ATC, the airline, or other 
aircraft. 
K. En-route weather and ride reports 
are not shared as much. 
 
 
9.  ATC coordinated deviations due to 
thunderstorms over the VHF. 
 
L. SOP does not involve human 
communication and coordination of 
cockpit with ATC however an 
improved weather monitoring and 
response system will be in place. 
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Descent/Terminal Area Arrival/Final Approach/Landing and Rollout 
Activity Vulnerabilities 
10.  When descent begins, ATC 
communicates over VHF radio or 
ACARS.  The aircraft provides its 
touchdown estimate and any other 
important information.  ATC sends arrival 
gate assignment and ground power status 
vocally over VHF or electronically 
through ACARS. 
M. All descent, approach, landing, 
and rollout information will be sent 
over ACARS. 
N. SOP does not involve human 
communication and coordination of 
cockpit with ATC. 
 
11.  Descent planning uses the FMS to 
calculate the flight profile.  Pilots do 
mental math to confirm the FMS 
instruction. 
O. In UAVs, no independent 
confirmation of the flight profile from 
the FMS will take place. 
 
12.  Automatic Terminal Information 
Service (ATIS):  Continuous radio 
broadcast of weather, instrument approach 
procedures, active runways, wind shear 
reports, visibility values for individual 
runways, braking capability, bird activity, 
and other safety information. 
P. The Captain must monitor ATIS 
in addition to other responsibilities. 
 
13.  As the aircraft descends below 10,000 
ft, it switches to a local barometric setting 
from ATC or ATIS and uses STAR or 
radar vectors from ATC to define a flight 
path. 
Q. Increasing use of standard arrival 
routes and less interaction with ATC 
for a flight path. 
R. SOP does not involve human 
communication and coordination of 
cockpit with ATC. 
14.  10 miles from landing, during 
precision approaches, GPS and ILS 
(Instrument Landing Systems) [Localizer 
and Glide Slope] are required. 
S. New aircraft and crews trained for 
these aircraft will not integrate well 
with antiquated airports that do not 
offer precision approaches. 
15.  Non-precision approaches use a local 
navigation aid or satellite for lateral track 
data but vertical track data comes from 
barometric referencing. 
T. New aircraft and crews trained for 
these aircraft will not integrate well 
with antiquated airports that do not 
offer precision approaches. 
16.  During very low visibility, autoland 
or HUD guidance is required. 
U. UAVs cannot use existing 
technologies designed to assist 
humans such as a HUD to facilitate 
with landing. 
17.  Once the aircraft leaves the runway, 
the First Officer communicates with 
ground control from taxi instructions and 
local ramp control to confirm gate status. 
V. The Captain must communicate 
with ground control and ramp control 
as well as operate the aircraft. 
W. SOP does not involve human 
communication and coordination of 
cockpit with ground and ramp control. 
Table 13.  Vulnerabilities 
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Clearly, given the JPDO intentions (Swenson 2006) of removing crew, 
eliminating voice communications, and reducing separation distances, many of the 
vulnerabilities identified above cannot be eliminated by changing the design.  However, 
the following vulnerabilities can be mitigated with appropriate design. 
K. En-route weather and ride reports are not shared as much 
L. SOP does not involve human communication and coordination of cockpit with 
ATC.  However, an improved weather monitoring and response system will be in 
place 
Q.  Increasing use of standard arrival routes and less interaction with ATC for a flight 
path 
S/T.  New aircraft and crews trained for these aircraft will not integrate well with 
antiquated airports that do not offer precision approaches 
 
A well designed user interface (UI) for sharing weather and ride reports with other 
aircraft over bodies of water and other zones that separate aircraft from ATC would do 
much to facilitate report sharing.  Similarly, a strong UI that takes advantage of the 
improved weather monitoring and response system could provide a suitable, and perhaps 
superior, replacement for the current voice system with ATC.  Also, an easy to use 
procedure must be developed for pilots to get a real time, dynamic arrival route when 
they feel uncomfortable with the STAR.  Finally, all airports should be fitted with 
precision approach equipment and all aircraft and crew should be equipped and trained to 
land in conditions where the precision system has failed. 
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APPENDIX III – ADS-B Deployment Schedule 
Time for Implementation and Absorption of Cost 
Years Objective 
0 Start of Transition, Execution of FAA Mandates. 
0-3 Certification of GPS SPS signal as the primary domestic navigation means.  
Increase coverage area of ADS-B system to cover low volume traffic areas. 
3-6 Require all commercial transport aircraft to certify or install an approved GPS 
navigation system.  Increase ADS-B coverage to all areas except the area with 
the highest traffic area.  Place low volume area NDB, VOR, and DME stations 
in inactive mode. 
6-8 Require installation of ADS-B by all commercial transport aircraft.  Complete 
ADS-B coverage area.  Inactivate NDB, VOR, and DME stations except those 
around major airports or route transitions. 
8-10 Inactivate remaining NDB, VOR, and DME stations; require all ATC users to 
have a certified GPS SPS system and ADS-B system. 
10 Transition Complete, NAS is Free-Flight Capable. 
 
Table 14.  ADS-B Transition Plan. 
Table Source (Blakey 2006) 
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APPENDIX IV – Cryptographic Designs 
Unlike IPSec, SSL/TLS operates at the transport layer.  It uses symmetric key algorithms 
to protect messages while a public key system handles key exchange.  After a handshake 
with the server, the communicating pair agrees on version, session ID, encryption 
method, and compression technique (Thanthry 2006).  An example of the activities that 
occur at the seven layers of the Internet layered architecture is presented below. 
 
Figure 24.  Layered Internet Architecture. 
Image Source (Shah 2006) 
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 Significant latency and variable round trip time in the ATN motivates the use of 
Performance Enhancing Proxies (PEP).  However, PEPs must have access to the transport 
layer header and IPSec hides this information both in transport mode and tunnel mode. 
 
 
Figure 25.  IP Datagrams. 
Image Source (Thanthry 2006) 
 
Solutions exist that involve multiple encryption/decryption operations at each PEP agent, 
but complexity makes this approach undesirable.  SSL/TLS is compatible with PEP 
agents but leaves the network susceptible to transport layer attacks.  This situation yields 
the classic security vs performance engineering tradeoff.  Thanthry et al’s simulation 
results presented below indicate that without PEP, IPSec and SSL/TLS are virtually 
identical.  However, the incorporation of PEP agents almost triples performance in the 
SSL/TLS implementation. 
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Throughput in Mbps 
 Without PEP With PEP 
Normal Scenario 6.7 - 
Normal Scenario with Satellite Link Impairments 0.61 1.77 
IPSec 0.5925 0 
SSL/TLS 0.5975 1.76 
 
Table 15.  Effect of Performance Enhancing Proxies. 
Table Source (Thanthry 2006) 
Thanthry et al feel that the performance gains offered by SSL/TLS are significant and 
offer sufficient security.  This author disagrees because a vulnerable transport layer 
permits certain distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS) (Greenspan 2004) and 
session hijacking.  A DDoS attack could cut off all aircraft from ground control if the 
satellite constellation was overwhelmed.  Session hijacking permits a hacker to 
masquerade as either an aircraft or ATC once a connection between the two is established 
(authentication occurs only at the start of the session). 
 The current US airspace system is protected against the so called “MIG-in-the-
Middle Attack” by encrypting the identify-friend-or-foe (IFF) system.  As the number of 
aircraft identification events will undoubtedly increase in NGATS, the MIG-in-the-
Middle Attack should be well understood by system architects in order to maintain or 
improve current levels of security.  The scenario is best explained through a supposedly 
true story: 
Several MIGs had loitered in southern Angola, just north of the South African air 
defense belt, until a flight of SAAF (South African Air Force) Impala bombers 
raided a target in Angola.  Then the MIGs turned sharply and flew openly through 
the SAAF’s air defenses, which sent IFF challenges.  The MIGs relayed them to 
the Angolan air defense batteries, which transmitted them at a SAAF bomber; the 
responses were relayed back in real time to the MIGs, which retransmitted them 
and were allowed through (Anderson 2001). 
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Reflection attacks arising from mutual authentication further complicates the story but 
the current NATO mode XII system, which utilizes many different encrypted challenges, 
is sufficient for NGATS. 
 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) was selected by the FAA to secure the ATN.  
It is compatible with both SSL/TLS and IPSec.  ECC is a public key cryptographic 
system based on the discrete logarithm problem.  Elliptic curves are of the form: 
baxxy ++= 32  
and takes shapes similar to the examples below. 
 
 
Figure 26.  Elliptic Curves. 
Image Source (Weisstein 2003) 
 
In ECC, the curve defines the elements of the set over which the group is calculated and 
the operations between elements. 
 To construct an ECC implementation, define a graph of size p by p where p is a 
very large prime.  This enables the construction of a field of integers modulo p, Fp, (all 
integers 0 to p-1).  Now, construct an elliptic curve such that there exists some (x,y) 
where x and y are members of the prime field.  The set of integer points on the curve 
forms a group.  The basic operation for encrypting and decrypting messages is point 
multiplication:  Q = kP. 
 Q:  public key 
 P:  base point (curve parameter) 
 k = private key (integer) 
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Suppose Alice and Bob want to communicate without Joseph comprehending their 
communications.  They may use the following algorithm for key exchange. 
1. Alice and Bob choose an elliptic curve and point, P.  Neither the curve nor the 
point must be kept secret. 
2. Alice’s private key is k but she only sends kP to Bob. 
3. Bob’s private key is l but he only sends lP to Alice. 
4. Both Alice and Bob can compute the symmetric key klP and begin sending secure 
messages. 
 
Note:  It is very difficult for Joseph to extract k or l from kP or lP 
 
Joseph’s dilemma is called the Discrete Logarithm Problem.  Formally, the 
problem is defined in the following way: 
Given points Q and P, find integer k such that Q=kP.   
The problem of finding a log in a group on an elliptic curve over a prime field is 
computationally expensive for a large prime field.  Brute force work of computing 2P, 
3P, until reaching kP is one option.  For example, suppose:  
k = 11 
Then 11P = 2(2(2P)) + 3P which requires 3 doubling and 3 addition operations. 
 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines the P192 curve which 
would require on average a doubling followed by 3 x 1057 additions.  If all the computers 
on the planet were employed to solve this problem, it would take thousands of years on 
average.  Although most applications use ECC for key exchange and a symmetric block 
cipher for “bulk encryption,” it should be noted that other algorithms exist that permit 
ECC to be used to encrypt/decrypt messages as well as provide digital signatures 
(Certicom 2004). 
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APPENDIX V - Electronic Warfare 
Information security within the civilian sector has historically isolated itself from 
the military field of electronic warfare (EW).  However, the recent application of EW 
techniques such as DDoS on computer networks has led to the incorporation of EW 
issues into non-military security strategies.  While information security is concerned with 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability, EW has similar priorities: 
Electronic Warfare Priorities 
1. Denial of service:  jamming, mimicry, and physical attack 
2. Deception:  targeting automated system or people 
3. Exploitation:  obtaining operationally valuable information from the “enemy’s” 
use of electronic systems 
 
Table 16.  Electronic Warfare. 
Table Source (Anderson 2001) 
Ultimately, EW is about control of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
 NGATS is concerned with electronic protection and electronic support.  While 
protection is concerned primarily with resisting attack, electronic support seeks to 
“identify and locate sources of intentional and unintentional electromagnetic energy.”  
The FAA should take the lead in electronic support activities, while all stakeholders in 
NGATS are responsible for electronic protection.   
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APPENDIX VI – Protocol Considerations 
Weak Protocols 
A variety of standard security protocols with well understood properties exist.  
Some should be used in NGATS while others should not.  So called “Simple 
Authentication” and “Challenge and Response” protocols should not be used in NGATS.  
Simple Authentication is found in devices such as IR tokens, commonly found on cars 
that permit them to enter secure parking garages.  They work by the token transmitting its 
name, T, as well as an encrypted value of T concatenated with N, the “nonce” (number 
used once).  The key is KT.  The freshness of the message is guaranteed by the nonce.  
Using standard protocol engineering language: 
T Æ G:T,(T,N)KT 
The gate, G, uses T to lookup KT and verifies that T emerges concatenated to a unique 
nonce.  There are numerous known attacks on this protocol so it should not be used for 
high security environments such as NGATS. 
 Challenge and Response is a two-pass protocol found on remote keyless entry 
systems in cars.  In this case the vehicle, V, sends a “random” number N to the key’s 
receiver.  The key then transmits back its identifier T along with the N encrypted under K. 
E Æ T:N 
T Æ E:(T,N)K 
The lack of true randomness in generating N makes this protocol inappropriate for high 
security systems. 
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Strong Protocols 
The correct use of certificates, digital signatures, and message encryption is 
essential to securing the ATN.  Certificates were first defined by (Kohnfelder 1978).  
They securely bind a user to a public key by signing it.  Trusted certification authorities 
(CAs) issue digital certificates that include information such as the user’s name and 
public key, certificate expiration date, algorithms, and other supporting data.  
Immediately, the issue of validating the issuer’s certificate arises, but this is easily 
resolved by constructing a hierarchy of certificate signatures up to the level of an 
authority that can be trusted and the public key is known.   
Digital signatures are a method whereby a sender can encode a message in such a 
way that the recipient can be sure of the sender’s identity.  This encoding is accomplished 
by the sender applying his private key to “encrypt” the message and the recipient 
applying the sender’s public key to get the original message.  Finally, encryption is used 
to ensure that third parties cannot read the message. 
The correct application of certificates, signatures, and encryption can achieve four 
objectives: 
1. Evidence that the message has not been altered 
2. Evidence as to the identity of the sender of the message 
3. Evidence as to the identity of the recipient of the message 
4. Evidence that third parties have not read the message 
 
Misapplications of certificates, signatures, and encryption as documented by Davis 
(Davis 2001), such as simply signing and then encrypting, permits surreptitious 
forwarding (Alice sends a message to Bob that he forwards to Joseph so Joseph thinks 
that Alice was communicating with him).  If Alice includes both her name and Bob’s 
name in the original plaintext message, this problem can be avoided.  Also, the use of 
 Page 128 of 133 
certificates can give Alice confidence that she has Bob’s correct public key in the first 
place.  The following scenario provides a correct application of the technologies and 
satisfies the constraints derived in the earlier analysis: 
Asymmetric Key Approach 
 
If ATC wants to communicate with the aircraft, ATC should: 
 
1) Obtain the aircraft’s certificate from the FAA. 
2) Use the universally available public key from the Certification Authority to verify 
the aircraft’s public key. 
3) Include ATC’s and the aircraft’s identifiers in the message. 
4) Sign the plaintext message with its private key. 
5) Encrypt the message with the aircraft’s public key. 
6) Send the encrypted message to the aircraft. 
 
When the aircraft receives the encrypted message, it should: 
 
1) Obtain ATC’s certificate. 
2) Use the universally available public key from the Certification Authority to verify 
ATC’s public key. 
3) Use its private key to decrypt the message. 
4) Use ATC’s public key obtained in step 2 to verify the signature and get the 
plaintext message. 
 
Note:   
a) The public keys need only be verified once.  Then, many messages can be 
exchanged without having to re-verify the public keys. 
b) If ECC is used for key exchange and a symmetric block cipher is used for bulk 
transfer, the Station-to-Station protocol should be used.  It is an authenticated key 
agreement with key confirmation protocol, achieves perfect forward secrecy, and 
does not use time stamps.  Further information on the correct use of key 
establishment schemes using discrete logarithm cryptography is available from 
NIST (Barker 2006). 
 
 
Table 17.  Secure Communication Protocol. 
 
 Page 129 of 133 
The robust scheme defined above also avoids the “Byzantine Failure” problem, which is 
a serious issue in a large ATC network.  Anderson describes the general problem below: 
…n generals defending Byzantium, t of whom have been bribed by the Turks to 
cause as much confusions as possible in the command structure.  The generals can 
pass oral message by courier, and the couriers are trustworthy.  Each general can 
exchange confidential and authentic communications with each other general.  
What is the maximum number t of traitors that can be tolerated? 
 
The key observation is that, if we have only 3 generals, say Anthony, Basil, and 
Charalampos, and Anthony is a traitor, then he can tell Basil, “Let’s attack,” and 
Charalampos “Let’s retreat.”  Basil can now say to Charalampos “Anthony says 
let’s attack,” but this doesn’t let Charalampos conclude that Anthony is the traitor.  
It could just as easily be Basil; Anthony could have said “Let’s retreat” to both of 
them, but Basil lied when he said “Anthony says let’s attack.” 
 
Lamport, Shostack, and Peace have shown that the traitor(s) can be identified if and only 
if: 
13 +≥ tn  
(Lamport 1982) 
Fortunately, the proper use of certificates, signatures, and encryption does not allow 
Anthony (if he is the traitor) to get away with sending contradictory messages to Basil 
and Charalampos. 
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